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Abstract
During the last decade, the number of runway incursions at airports in the United States
and worldwide has increased. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has developed
the Runway Safety Program (RSP) to address these concerns and improve the safety of
the National Airspace System (NAS). The purpose of this study was to determine
whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP has effectively reduced runway incursions at the
nation’s 5 busiest airports using data from 3 years before and 3 years after the RSP. A
comparison group interrupted time-series design was used to determine the impact of the
RSP. A public policy framework served as the theoretical foundation for this study. Data
were collected from the FAA on runway incursions occurring from October 1, 2005
through September 30, 2014 and assessed for appropriate inclusion criteria. An analysis
of the dataset using chi-square and Mann-Whitney U tests established that though the
RSP has made progress, it has not effectively reduced runway incursions at the nation’s 5
busiest airports. The RSP has decreased the number of runway incursion caused by air
traffic controllers, reduced the overall severity of runway incursions, as well as positively
influenced when, during the phase of flight, most runway incursions happen. An increase
in pilot deviations suggests finding better ways to reduce these type of runway incursions
is critical, especially with the forecasted growth in air travel. Continued deployment of
runway safety technology is also important. With increased aviation safety, positive
social change will occur through enhanced public safety while traveling, safer working
environments at airports, as well as economic stimulus resulting from increased aviation
activities benefiting individuals and developing countries throughout the world.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Background
Since the Wright Brothers’ first powered aircraft flight on December 17, 1903,
aviation and air transportation in the United States and throughout the world has
continued to grow significantly (Grant, 2007). In the 21st century, aviation has become a
normally accepted part of people’s daily lives. Aviation is defined as the branch of
science, business, or technology that deals with any part of the operation of machines that
fly through the air (Aviation, 2012). With all aspects of aviation, inherent risks are
associated with flight operations, especially when multiple aircraft are involved (Federal
Aviation Administration [FAA] Flight Standards Service, 2012).
One of the most significant risks in aviation is that one aircraft collides with
another aircraft. This danger is increased when multiple aircrafts are conducting
operations in close proximity to one another (FAA Flight Standards Service, 2012, pp. 3–
6). This risk is further exacerbated when more than one aircraft attempts to concurrently
use the same active runway. When an aircraft or other vehicles interfere with the
operation of an aircraft on a particular runway, the potential hazard exists for a runway
incursion. The FAA (2014d) defined a runway incursion as
any occurrence at an airport involving an aircraft or object on the ground that
creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of separation with an aircraft taking
off, intending to take off, landing or intending to land within one mile. (p. 1)
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A runway incursion is a complex event with unlimited reasons to explain its occurrence,
making it difficult to model a standard runway incursion (Feerar, 2003; Rogerson &
Lambert, 2012).
Runway incursions at the nation’s airports are a growing threat to all of the
traveling public and have been the cause of accidents in the past (Schonefeld & Moller,
2012). Air traffic organizations and government administrators have acknowledged a lack
of effective preventative measures, and more needs to be done to reduce the potential for
runway incursions (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012, p. 32). The largest threat to airplane
passengers’ safety occurs not while they are flying, but while they are on the runway
before or after the actual flight (Ricafort, 2007). Runway incursions have captured the
continued attention of the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) list of “Most
Wanted” safety improvements for the past decade (FAA Technology Assessment Team,
2002, p. 5). According to Dickey (2005), runway incursions happen frequently and at
every airport, creating a risk for pilots, airport employees, and passengers throughout the
world (p. 1).
In the last decade, an increase in the number of runway incursions has occurred in
the United States (Air Line Pilots Association [ALPA], 2007; Office of the Inspector
General [OIG], 2014; Pyke, 2007). Speculation exists regarding the reasons for this
increase in runway incursions. Marroquin (2010) argued that the higher rate of runway
incursions is a case of mathematics; with more jetliners landing and crossing other
runways, the chances of a runway incursion increase. The risk of a runway incursion that
could potentially kill hundreds of people is a developing threat, which will increase in
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likelihood if the forecasted increases in air traffic occur as predicted in the United States
during the next 2 decades (ALPA, 2007; FAA, 2013a).
Runway Incursions are a Global Threat
The potential hazards associated with runway incursions are not just a threat in
the United States, but also worldwide. During 2013, Italy reported a 40% increase in the
number of runway incursions (Mark, 2014). In an effort to combat the threat of runway
incursions in their country, Italy’s National Flight Safety Agency (Agenzia Nazionale per
la Sicurezza del Volo, 2013) issued safety recommendations regarding runway
incursions. Canada has also reported an increase in their number of runway incursions,
with an incursion happening almost daily (Campion-Smith, 2013). Because of the
increasing number of runway incursions, the Canadian Safety Board included runway
incursions on its list of the most significant transportation problems posing the largest
risk to the traveling public (Campion-Smith, 2013).
The global threat of runway incursions has prompted many countries to seek
solutions (Nielsen, 2009). Because of the significant number of runway incursions
occurring throughout Europe, including actual collisions resulting in significant loss of
life, a European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions was implemented
(European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation [EUROCONTROL], 2011). In
this action plan, the inherent dangers associated with runway incursions, their potential
causes were identified, as well as which mitigating actions may be effective in reducing
them (EUROCONTROL, 2011).
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With the increasing frequency of runway incursions worldwide, many countries
are developing safety programs designed to reduce the number and inherent threat posed
by runway incursions (Nielsen, 2009). The International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO, 2014) is a specialized agency of the United Nations and develops international
Standards and Recommended Practices, which the 191 member countries reference when
developing their legally enforceable national civil aviation regulations. The ICAO
established that during the past 5 years, one-third of all aviation accidents were linked to
runway operations (Werfelman, 2011). Investigators have established a connection
between growth in air traffic and an increase in runway incursions, demonstrating that a
traffic increase of 20% could result in as much as a 140% jump in the number of runway
incursions (Lounsbury, 1999). With air traffic forecast to grow in the United States and
throughout the world during the next several decades (FAA, 2013a; FAA, 2015), the
threat of runway incursions and the potential loss of life also increases.
The FAA has recognized the danger of runway incursions and has developed a
program to address these concerns and improve the safety of the National Airspace
System (NAS). The FAA is the federal agency charged with keeping the NAS in the
United States operating in a safe and efficient manner (Birtles, Duke, & Sharpe, 2001;
Dilger, 2003). The FAA has worked toward the reduction of runway incursions through
the creation and implementation of the Runway Safety Program (RSP).
The FAA Runway Safety Program
The RSP was created on November 1, 2002, pursuant to FAA (2002) Order
7050.1. The objective of the RSP is the reduction in the number and severity of runway
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incursions occurring in the United States (FAA, 2008, p. 5). The RSP works to “promote
technology and improve training, procedures, evaluation, analysis, testing, and
certification to reduce the risk of runway incursions resulting from errors by pilots, air
traffic controllers, pedestrians, vehicle operators, tub operators, and individuals
conducting taxi operations” (FAA, 2008, p. 6). The FAA (2002) Order 7050.1 placed the
responsibility for the safety program on the newly created Office of Runway Safety,
requiring it to work with other FAA organizations as well as the aviation community to
identify and implement activities and technologies designed to increase runway safety (p.
2).
The FAA (2002) Order 7050.1 was amended to improve the reporting of runway
incursions and also added runway excursions to its coverage. The FAA Order 7050.1A,
issued on September 16, 2010, modified FAA Order 7050.1 and adopted the ICAO
definition of a runway incursion, allowing for enhanced worldwide uniform reporting of
runway incursions. The FAA Order 7050.1B issued on November 11, 2013 modified
FAA (2010b) Order 7050.1A by expanding the scope of the RSP to include the
prevention of runway excursions. A runway excursion is defined as “a veer-off or
overrun off the runway surface” (FAA, 2013b, p. 3).
The FAA (2008) 2009–2011 National Runway Safety Plan established the goals,
strategies, and objectives for the RSP for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 (p. 5). This
plan’s strategy was to reduce the frequency of runway incursions and thereby make
runway incursions of any type rare. Ideally, the underlying strategy of reducing the
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severity of runway incursions would result in only minor rule infractions instead of near
aircraft collisions (FAA, 2008, p. 5).
Through the 2009–2011 runway safety strategy, the FAA sought a reduction in
the frequency, type, and severity of runway incursions (FAA, 2008, p. 5). According to
the FAA (2008), this goal was to be achieved through a vision, a mission, and a set of
objectives that provide guideposts and milestones (p. 5). As the ultimate outcome is zero
runway incursions, the FAA focused on corrective actions designed to reduce the
potential for human error through awareness, outreach, training, technology aids, and
infrastructure improvements that enhance situational awareness. The continuing efforts
by the FAA include revisions to procedures, changes to airport geometry, and installation
of technology and infrastructure designed to mitigate the potential for human error and
collisions in the high energy segments of the aircraft’s operation (FAA, 2008, p. 5).
One emphasis of the 2009–2011 FAA safety plan was to reduce the opportunity
for aircraft collision risk in the high energy segments of the aircraft’s operation (FAA,
2008, p. 5). The RSP not only emphasized the importance of the type and severity of a
particular runway incursion, but also focused on the “phase of the flight” when the
runway incursion happened during the flight operation (FAA, 2008, p. 5). As part of the
RSP, each of these three target areas were considered when attempting to reduce runway
incursions and are relevant in determining whether the 2009–2011 RSP achieved its goals
and reduced runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports.
The RSP focused on the elements of airport surface safety, including runway
incursions and wrong runway departures (FAA, 2008, p. 4). The RSP sought to promote
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technology; improve training; and enhance the procedures, evaluation, analysis, and
testing of runway incursions to reduce the safety risk resulting from errors by pilots, air
traffic controllers, pedestrians, and vehicle operators (FAA, 2008). As air travel is
expected to increase during the next several decades (FAA, 2013a), a corresponding
growth will occur in the number of takeoffs and landings (FAA, 2008). Because of
increased flight operations, the potential for runway incursions will also increase
(Transport Canada, National Civil Aviation Safety Committee, 2000). Determining
whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP has been effective in reducing the type, severity, and,
when during the phase of flight, the runway incursions happened at the nation’s five
busiest airports was the objective of this study.
Recognizing the need for continued improvement of runway safety, the FAA
(2008) has used three primary metrics to assess runway incursions: the frequency, the
severity, and type (p. 7). The FAA identifies frequency as the total number of runway
incursions within a period of time, severity as how serious a particular runway incursion
is in relationship to its causing an accident, and type as the description of the nature of the
runway incursion based on the parties involved (FAA, 2008). The FAA through the RSP
has invested in programs and technology designed to improve runway safety, asserting
that the technologies implemented as part of the 2009–2011 National Runway Safety
Plan would prove successful in reducing the frequency and severity of runway incursions
(FAA, 2008, p. 15). To assist in the reduction of runway incursions in the United States,
other governmental agencies have also investigated the potential causes of runway
incursions as well as the FAA’s policies and procedures for reducing them.
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Other Governmental Agencies’ Recommendations to Reduce Runway Incursions
Interested governmental agencies in the United States have also recognized the
inherent threat that runway incursions pose to the NAS and have provided the FAA with
recommendations to reduce runway incursions (FAA, 2008). The 2009–2011 National
Runway Safety Plan addressed the recommendations from the NTSB, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
for the Department of Transportation (FAA, 2008, p. 15). These governmental agencies
provided recommendations to the FAA (2008) to help reduce the frequency, types, and
severity of runway incursions. These recommendations were incorporated into the 2009–
2011 RSP (FAA, 2008, p. 15).
National Transportation Safety Board
The NTSB (2015) is an independent federal agency charged by congress to
investigate and determine the probable cause of every civil aviation accident in the
United States. In their July 6, 2000 safety recommendation letter to the FAA, the NTSB
(2000) suggested that runway incursions could be reduced by making modifications to
the physical structure at airports as well as procedural changes. These recommendations
included installation of ground movement safety systems, amending air traffic control
clearance procedures by requiring all runway crossing be made by explicit air traffic
control (ATC) instruction (NTSB, 2000, p. 16) and mandating that flight operations
complete arrival landing distance assessments prior to every landing using existing
performance data and actual conditions, while ensuring a 15% safety margin (p. 16).
Though offered by the NTSB in 2000, the FAA did not implement these
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recommendations into a safety program until their inclusion in the RSP in 2008 (FAA,
2008).
Government Accountability Office
The U.S. GAO (2015) is an independent agency that investigates, conducts
evaluations, and performs audits for congress. The GAO performs program reviews and
analyses and makes recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the
federal government (GAO, 2015). In December 2007, the GAO released the Aviation
Runway and Ramp Safety Report, which provided recommendations to the FAA
designed to assist in their efforts to reduce runway incursions. The GAO (2007)
suggested that the FAA use the Office of Runway Safety to lead the agency’s safety
program, which included preparing a new national runway safety plan, establishing a
nonpunitive voluntary safety reporting program for air traffic controllers, and developing
an implementation method to collect data on runway overruns that do not result in
damage or injury (p. 59). The GAO also suggested that the FAA develop a mitigation
plan to address controller overtime issues and work with the aviation industry and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration to develop methods to collect and
analyze data regarding ramp accidents as well as develop a strategic plan aimed at
reducing accidents in the airport’s ramp areas. The FAA incorporated the GAO 2007
recommendations into their RSP (FAA, 2008). Since the creation and implementation of
the RSP, the GAO has continued to monitor and provide feedback and recommendations
designed to assist the FAA in achieving its objective of reduced runway incursions and
increased aviation safety (GAO, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014).
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Office of the Inspector General
The OIG is a component of the U.S. Department of Transportation. The OIG is an
independent auditing group responsible for reporting problems and making
recommendations (based on audits, investigations, and inspections) to the Secretary of
Transportation and to Congress (OIG, n.d.). In a report on the FAA’s progress in
reducing runway incursions, the OIG (2010) assessed the actions taken by the agency to
identify and correct the causes of runway incursions as well as address the issues that
could affect aviation safety throughout the NAS. The OIG recommended that the FAA
take actions to help reduce runway incursions. The OIG suggested that the FAA
introduce initiatives that increase pilot participation in the Runway Incursion Information
Evaluation Program and (a) analyze data collected to identify and mitigate runway
incursion causal factors, (b) work with pilots and airline communities to create a process
for regional RSP managers to request site-specific redacted Aviation Safety Action Plan
information on runway incursions and surface incidents, and (c) develop an automated
means to share best practices in reducing runway incursions (OIG, 2010, p. 2). The OIG
also suggested that the FAA establish benchmarks for implementing JANUS, National
Air Traffic Professionalism Program and Crew Resource Management training, and
tower simulator training technologies at airport traffic control towers with a high number
of runway incursions caused by controller operational errors. In addition, the OIG
suggested that the FAA require the use of safety risk analysis to evaluate existing
operational procedures at airports with a potential of runway safety risks and require each
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line of business to include quantitative goals in its annual business plan for reducing
runway incursion risks that are specific to oversight responsibilities.
The FAA implemented the recommendations made by the NTSB, GAO, and OIG
as part of their 2009–2011 National Runway Safety Plan (FAA, 2008). The FAA took the
following actions: (a) implemented the safety management system (SMS) in the Runway
Safety Office, (b) created new and improved training and instruction, (c) created the
FAAS Team that would support the General Airport Surface Incident Mitigation Strategy
at both the national and regional levels, (d) provided additional outreach throughout the
United States, (e) enhanced airport infrastructure designed to recognize potential runway
incursions, and (f) developed technology to aid in the reduction of runway incursions and
surface incidents (FAA, 2008, pp. 21–25). As a result of these actions, the FAA hoped
that the number and severity of runway incursions would diminish. According to the U.S.
Commercial Aviation Safety Team, a combination of technologies could increase a flight
crew’s situational awareness and improve conflict-alerting capability during ground
operations, thereby reducing the risk posed by runway incursions by as much as 95%
(ALPA, 2007).
A series of new practices and procedures have been implemented in an effort to
reduce the number of runway incursions throughout the United States. Although these
changes have had a positive effect on reducing the likelihood of a runway incursion,
according to government statistics, the number of runway incursions at U.S. airports
between 2002 and 2004 remained nearly constant, whereas total air traffic volume
decreased by 3% (ALPA, 2007). Despite the implementation of risk mitigation
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techniques and reduced air traffic volume, the FAA has not reduced the rate of runway
incursions. The Air Line Pilots Association (2007) study was one of the factors that
prompted the implementation of the RSP (FAA, 2008).
The U.S. Department of Transportation OIG in 2014 issued a report critical of the
FAA’s progress of runway safety issues. The report asserted that more needed to be done
in curtailing runway incursions at the nation’s airports and stated “Between fiscal years
2011 to 2013, the number of runway incursions at U.S. airports increased 30 percent,
despite slight declines in air traffic operations during that time” (OIG, 2014, p. 14). This
ongoing concern about runway incursions previously caught the attention of the U.S.
Congress.
U.S. Congress’ Concerns Regarding Runway Incursions
The U.S. Congress also recognized the threat that runway incursions pose to
aviation safety, especially in light of the anticipated growth in air traffic during the next 2
decades. On February 14, 2012, the President of the United States signed the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act (FMRA) of 2012 into law. Section 314 of the Act
provided direction to the FAA regarding runway safety (FAA, 2012). The act required
that the FAA administrator provide a strategic runway safety plan to congress. The
FMRA required that the FAA’s strategic runway safety plan include (a) goals to improve
runway safety; (b) the near- and long-term actions designed to reduce the severity,
number, and rate of runway incursions, losses of standard separation, and operational
errors; (c) time frames and resources needed for the actions described in Clause 2; (d) a
continual evaluative process to track performance toward the goals referred to in Clause
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1; and (e) a review with respect to runway safety of every commercial service airport in
the United States and a proposed action to improve airport lighting, provide better signs,
as well as improve runway and taxiway markings at those airports (FAA, 2012). The
FMRA directed the administrator to address the increased runway safety risk associated
with the expected increase in the volume of air traffic (FAA, 2012).
The FMRA (FAA, 2012) directed the FAA’s compliance with applicable
provisions of the FMRA within a period of 6 months following the act’s passage. The
administrator must develop a process for tracking and investigating operational errors,
losses of standard separation, and runway incursions (FAA, 2012). The resulting data and
report to congress had to include procedures for (a) who is responsible for tracking
operational errors, losses of standard separation, and runway incursions, including a
process for lower level employees to report to higher supervisory levels and for frontline
managers to receive the information in a timely manner; (b) conducting periodic random
audits of the oversight process; and (c) ensuring proper accountability (FAA, 2012). The
administrator’s report must also contain a plan for the installation, deployment, and
integration of safety systems into the Next Generation Air Transportation System
(NextGen) Implementation Plan, which would alert flight crewmembers and air traffic
controllers of potential runway incursions (FAA, 2012).
Significant Growth in Air Travel Predicted Through 2034
Aviation forecasts predict a continued and steady growth in air travel with an
increased number of passengers flying more miles each year during the next 2 decades
(FAA, 2013a). The FAA has previously measured air travel in terms of revenue
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passenger miles (RPMs). An RPM (n.d.) represents one paying passenger traveling one
mile. For U.S. airlines, the agency’s FAA (2013a) Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Years 2014
to 2034 projected RPM growth to average 208% per year from 2014 through 2034.
Domestic RPMs are forecast to increase at 2.4% annually, and international RPMs are
expected to increase by as much as 4.3% annually (FAA, 2013a, p. 80). According to the
FAA forecast, the total number of people flying on U.S. airlines will increase by .08%
from 2013 levels to 745.5 million in 2014 and grow to 1.15 billion in 2034 (pp. 14–16).
With the average percentage of seats filled per flight having reached a record level of
83.2% in 2013 (FAA, 2013a, p. 16), the anticipated growth in air travel has begun.
In addition to the expected increases in passenger travel, air cargo is also expected
to increase (FAA, 2013a). Air cargo traffic is measured in terms of revenue ton miles
(RTMs), which represents one ton of cargo flown one mile (RTM, n.d.). Air traffic cargo
is expected to more than double by 2034 at an average growth rate of 4.1% with load
factors expected to reach 83.8% in 2034 (FAA, 2014b, p. 2). Landings and takeoffs at
FAA operated control towers are expected to increase from 49.9 million in 2013 to 61.9
million in 2034 (FAA, 2014b, p. 2). As the NAS becomes more complex, the FAA looks
toward new technologies to meet the growing demand for safe and efficient air travel in
the United States and around the world (FAA, 2014b).
With growth anticipated in air traffic as a result of the increasing number of
passenger and cargo flights, the strain on the NAS will likely increase the potential for
runway incursions. In addressing these concerns, the FAA has implemented four strategic
initiatives. These initiatives include (a) raising the bar on safety by using safety
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management principles to make smarter, risk-based decisions throughout the agency and
with industry and global stakeholders; (b) rebalancing existing services and modernizing
the infrastructure, including advancing NextGen, to reduce costs and become more
efficient in the long run, as the FAA safely integrates new types of users into the nation’s
airspace; (c) building on the U.S. history of leadership in shaping international standards
to continue to improve aviation safety and efficiency around the world; and (d) attracting
and developing the best talent with the appropriate leadership and technical skills to
undertake the transformation of the U.S. national aviation system (FAA, 2014b, pp. 1–2).
The expected growth in air traffic both in the United States and worldwide
punctuates the need for a method in reducing runway incursions at the nation’s airports.
The conclusions developed from this research study are significant in determining the
effectiveness of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP in reducing the type, severity, and phase of
flight implications of runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports.
The Five Busiest U.S. Airports
The FAA uses criteria when determining which airports in the United States are
the busiest. Historically, the two criteria used by the FAA and in most studies to identify
the nation’s busiest airports were passenger boardings and aircraft movements. When
allocating government funds for airports in the United States, the FAA (2014c) uses
passenger boardings. A passenger boarding is defined as each time a person gets on and
departs in an aircraft (FAA, 1999). The FAA (2014a) has also used the term hub to
identify busy commercial service airports. Hubs are categorized by the FAA as large,
medium, or small (Heymann, Hans-Joachim, & Norbert, 2006). Large hubs are those
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airports that account for at least 1% of total U.S. boardings (FAA, 2014a). Medium hubs
in the United States are defined as airports that each account for between 0.25% and 1%
of the total passenger boardings (FAA, 2014a). Small hubs are defined as airports that
account for at least 0.05%, but less than 0.25% of total passenger boardings (FAA,
2014a).
Additionally, the FAA tracks the number of aircraft movements at each towered
airport in the United States. An aircraft movement is defined as either a takeoff or landing
of an aircraft (FAA, 1999). For this study, FAA data from the last 3 calendar years
(2011–2013) of passenger boardings and aircraft movements were used to determine the
five busiest U.S. airports. Consistently, both the total passenger boardings and aircraft
movements identified the same five busiest U.S. airports. Table 1 displays the FAA’s
passenger boardings and aircraft movement data for years 2011 through 2013.
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Table 1
FAA’s Passenger Boardings and Aircraft Movements
Years
2011

2012

2013

Passenger
boardings

Aircraft
movements

Passenger
boardings

Aircraft
movements

Passenger
boardings

Aircraft
movements

HartsfieldJackson Atlanta
International
Airport (ATL)

44,414,121

923,996

45,798,809

930,310

45,308,685

911,074

O’Hare
International
Airport (ORD)

31,892,301

878,798

32,171,743

878,108

32,278,906

883,287

Los Angeles
International
Airport (LAX)

30,528,737

702,895

31,326,268

698,619

32,427,115

614,917

Dallas/Fort
Worth
International
Airport (DFW)

27,518,358

646,803

28,022,877

650,124

29,018,883

678,059

Denver
International
Airport (DEN)

25,667,499

628,796

25,799,832

612,567

25,497,348

582,653

Airports

The FAA data depicted in Table 1 establishes the five busiest U.S. airports for
2011 through 2013: (a) Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL), (b)
O’Hare International Airport (ORD), (c) Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), (d)
Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), and (e) Denver International Airport
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(DEN). With the highest numbers in both passenger boardings and aircraft movements,
these airports were used in this study to determine if the FAA 2009–2011 RSP has
reduced runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports.
Problem Statement
Runway incursions continue to create significant safety risks at the nations’
airports and will likely increase as air traffic grows during the next several decades
(FAA, 2015). As the U.S. agency charged with the responsibility for ensuring aviation
safety (Birtles et al., 2001; FAA, 2010), the FAA (2002, 2008) has implemented a
program designed to reduce runway incursions. Although the FAA struggles with
reducing runway incursions, the best ways to accomplish this objective are still not clear.
Determining whether the FAA’s methods have been reducing runway incursion is a
question that needs to be addressed. Through this study, I sought to answer this question
by comparing the types, severity, and phases of flight of runway incursions that have
occurred at the nation’s five busiest airports before and after the implementation of the
FAA’s RSP. As such, the problem presented in this research study was whether the
FAA’s 2009–2011 RSP has reduced runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest
airports. An increased understanding of the relationship between the types, severity, and
phases of flight of runway incursions before and after the implementation of the RSP
provides information that will be helpful in improving the way in which the FAA
approaches this important safety concern.
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Purpose of the Study
Because one of the primary functions of government is to maintain order and
safety for its citizens (Lowi, Ginsberg, Shepsle, & Ansolabehere, 2015), ensuring the
highest levels of safety within the NAS is of importance. I conducted this study to
determine if modifications need to be made to the FAA’s RSP. If the same types,
severity, and phase of flight runway incursions are occurring both before and after the
FAA 2009–2011 RSP report, then changes need to be made to fix the program. The FAA
has not addressed the effect of their RSP in terms of whether safety has improved in
relationship to types, severity, and phase of flight of the runway incursions at the nation’s
five busiest airports. This information is essential to determine whether future runway
safety programs should be modified.
I conducted a quantitative study between several significant variables identifiable
in all runway incursions. According to Creswell (2009), the design of a quantitative
purpose statement includes the variables in the study and their relationship, the
participants, and the research site (p. 117). Here, the quantitative analysis method allowed
me to determine whether the dependent variables (types, severity, and phases of flight)
occurring before and after (pre vs. post) the implementation of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP
were sufficiently different from one another. The relationship between these variables
determined whether the FAA RSP reduced runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest
airports. The results of this study can be used to improve the effectiveness of future
runway safety programs both in the United States and around the world. Public
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administrators work to create and improve public policies, which help to improve safety
and security for its citizens (Lowi et al., 2015).
The FAA is charged with certificating airports pursuant to Part 139 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FAA, 2016a). To be certificated, the airport must meet established
safety requirements (FAA, 2016a, p. 1). When these requirements have been achieved
and approved by the FAA, these airports can legally operate commercial aircraft
operations. Information resulting from this study will permit the FAA and its public
administrators to increase as necessary the applicable standards under Part 139, thereby
ensuring enhanced safety within the NAS. With an improved runway safety program, the
number, types, and severity of runway incursions should decrease, and the overall safety
of the nation’s airports should increase, thereby making air transportation safer for the
flying public. A worldwide reduction in runway incursions is critical in light of the
forcasted growth in flight operations during the next several decades (FAA, 2015).
Nature of the Study
In this study, I focused on improving aviation safety within the United States and
throughout the world by reducing the number of runway incursions. By quantitatively
analyzing data drawn from the FAA’s RSP, I was able to determine whether the FAA
RSP is reducing runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. Using a
summative effect-based evaluation, I analyzed FAA data of runway incursions to
determine if any changes in the types, severity, and phase of flight of runway incursions
occurred before and after the implementation of the RSP. I used a comparison group,
interrupted time series design (Henry, 2010) for this longitudinal study, as data exists to
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compare the effect of the 2009–2011 RSP before and after the implementation of the
RSP. In this manner, the effect of the FAA’s RSP, as well as its applicable policies, were
determined.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Literature relevant to program evaluation and runway incursions provided the
basis for the questions and hypotheses of this study. According to Creswell (2009),
quantitative research questions inquire about the relationship among variables that the
researcher seeks to better understand (p. 132). I considered the relationship between
variables occurring before and after the implementation of the FAA’s 2009–2011 RSP.
Research Questions
Is there a relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur on the
runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP?
Is there a relationship between the severity of runway incursions that occur on the
runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP?
Is there a relationship between the phase of flight when the runway incursion
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP?
Hypotheses
Ho1: There is no relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur
on the runway before and after the 2009–2011 Runway Safety Program.
Ha1: There is a relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur on
the runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
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Ho2: There is no relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
Ha2: There is a relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
Ho3: There is no relationship between the phase of flight when the runway
incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
Ha3: There is a relationship between the phase of flight when the runway
incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
Theoretical Base
According to Kerlinger (1979), a theory is “a set of interrelated constructs
(variables), definitions, and propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by
specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining natural phenomena”
(p. 64). A public policy framework served as the theoretical foundation for this study.
The public policy framework was not only as a guideline for analyzing phenomenon, but
also a basis for understanding the significance of unusual findings (Knoepfel, Larrue,
Varone, & Hill, 2011).
To determine whether the FAA RSP has reduced runway incursions, I made a
comparison between runway incursions occurring before and after the implementation of
the RSP. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Holland (1986) established the theoretical
base for using comparative group design when analyzing the effect of policy and
programs. Researchers have used impact evaluations using quantitative estimates
between comparative groups when establishing the causal effects of programs (Henry,
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2010). More specifically, using an interrupted time-series design (a type of comparative
group design for measuring the impact of a program) is appropriate for longitudinal
studies where data exists for before and after the implementation of the program (Henry,
2010). The interrupted time-series design involves observations of the same variable,
which is expected to change because of the effect of the program. The FAA data on the
type, severity, and phase of flight for runway incursions occurring before and after the
implementation of the RSP were available for analysis. Consistent with the interrupted
time-series design, I analyzed these variables to determine the effect of the RSP, and I
established the effectiveness of the RSP in achieving its intended purpose of reducing
runway incursions at the five busiest U.S. airports.
Definition of Terms
The following provides definitions for the technical terms, jargon, and other
special words used in this study.
Aerodrome: A defined area on land or water intended to be used either wholly or
in part for the arrival, departure, and movement of aircraft. The term also includes any
buildings, installations, and equipment in this area (“Aerodrome,” 2012)
Aerospace: The branch of science and technology that deals with travel in the
space above the surface of the earth. Aerospace includes travel in the atmosphere and in
the vast regions outside of the earth’s atmosphere (“Aerospace,” 2012).
Air traffic control: The control of aircraft traffic from the ground. Air traffic
control is done from control towers with personnel who direct air traffic in the vicinity of
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an airport and air route traffic control centers whose personnel direct air traffic along the
airways between airports (“Air Traffic Control,” 2012).
Airport: An area of land or water that is used, or intended to be used, for the
landing and takeoff of aircraft and includes its buildings and facilities, if any
(Aeronautics and Space, 1962).
Category A (Cat. A): A serious incident in which a collision was narrowly
avoided (FAA, 2008, p. 27).
Category B (Cat. B): Separation decreases and a significant potential exists for
collision (FAA, 2008, p. 27).
Category C (Cat. C): Separation decreases, but ample time and distance exist to
avoid a potential collision (FAA, 2008, p. 27).
Category D (Cat. D): Incident that meets the definition of runway incursion, such
as incorrect presence of a single vehicle/person/aircraft on the protected area of a surface
designated for the landing and takeoff of aircraft but with no immediate safety
consequences (FAA, 2008, p. 27).
Commercial aviation operations: Scheduled or charter-for-hire aircraft used to
carry passengers or cargo. Airlines, air cargo, and charter services typically operate these
aircraft. The group of aircraft operations includes jet transports and commuter aircraft
(FAA, 2008, p. 27).
General aviation (GA): GA operations encompass the full range of activity from
student pilots to multihour, multirated pilots flying sophisticated aircraft for business of
pleasure. This group of aircraft operations include small GA aircrafts (less than 12,500
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lbs. maximum takeoff weight) and large general aviation aircrafts (maximum takeoff
weight larger than or equal to 12,500 lbs.). The small GA aircraft tends to be a singlepiloted aircraft, such as a Cessna 152 or Piper Cherokee. A corporate or executive aircraft
with a two-person flight crew, for example a Cessna Citation C550 or a Gulfstream V,
represents the large GA aircraft (FAA, 2008).
Hot spot: A location on an aerodrome movement area with a history or potential
risk of collision or runway incursions and in which heightened attention by pilots or
drivers is necessary (FAA, 2008; International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO],
2007).
JANUS: JANUS is a technique designed to improve the data collection process for
operational errors by applying human factors principles to develop interventions to
enhance performance (FAA, 2008, p. 28). The overall purpose is to understand the role of
the individual, situation, and work-related factors as they influence air traffic controllers’
operational performance. The objectives are to develop an improved understanding of the
human factors relating to individual performance and the occurrence of operational errors
and to broaden the role of cognitive factors as they influence the performance of air
traffic controllers (FAA, 2008, p. 28).
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB): An independent U.S. federal
agency that investigates every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant
accidents in the other modes of transportation conducts special investigations and safety
studies and issues safety recommendations to prevent future accidents (FAA, 2008, p.
28).
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NextGen Implementation Plan: This plan defines the FAA’s path to the Next
Generation Air Transportation System. NextGen contains funded commitments to new
operational capabilities; new airport infrastructure; and improvements to safety, security,
and environmental performance. The plan’s management process ensures these will be
delivered by a near-term date. The FAA and its partners are also undertaking research,
policy and requirements development, and other activities to assess the feasibility and
benefits of additional proposed system changes. The goal of this plan is to turn these
proposals into commitments and to guide them into use (FAA, 2008, p. 28).
Office of the Inspector General (OIG): The OIG has a responsibility to report,
both to the secretary of transportation and to the congress, program and management
problems and recommendations to correct them. The OIG carries out these duties through
a nationwide network of audits, investigations, inspections, and other mission-related
functions performed by OIG components (FAA, 2008, p. 29).
Operational deviation: An occurrence attributable to an element of the air traffic
system in which applicable separation minima were maintained, but an aircraft, vehicle,
equipment, or personnel encroached on a landing area that was delegated to another
position of operation without prior coordinate and approval (FAA, 2008, p. 28).
Operational error: An action by an air traffic controller that results in less than
the required minimum separation between two or more aircrafts or between an aircraft
and obstacle (e.g., vehicles, equipment, or personnel on runways; FAA, 2008, p. 29).
Pilot deviation: An action of a pilot that violates any federal aviation regulation
(FAA, 2008, p. 29).
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Runway incursion: Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect
presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated
for the landing and takeoff of aircraft (FAA, 2008, p. 29).
Runway incursion error type: Operational error or deviation, pilot deviation, or
vehicle or pedestrian deviation. These error types are not necessarily an indication of the
cause of the runway incursion; they typically refer to the last event in a chain of pilot, air
traffic controller, or vehicle operator actions that led to the runway incursion (FAA, 2008,
p. 29).
Surface incident: Any event in which unauthorized or unapproved movements
occur in the airport movement area, or an occurrence in the movement area associated
with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of flight. A surface
incident can occur anywhere on the airport’s surface, including the runway. The FAA
further classifies surface incidents as either a runway incursion or a nonrunway incursion
(FAA, 2008, p. 30).
Vehicle/pedestrian deviation: Vehicles or pedestrians entering or moving on the
runway movement area without authorization from air traffic control that interferes with
aircraft operations (FAA, 2008, p. 30).
Assumptions
I incorporated several assumptions into this study. The first is that the FAA
successfully implemented the RSP as the five busiest U.S. airports. This assumption was
based on the fact that the FAA RSP is a national program charged with ensuring the
safety of the nation’s air traffic control system. I also assumed that the FAA is focused on
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improving safety at the nation’s five busiest airports because they constitute the largest
number of passenger boardings and aircraft movements within the United States (FAA,
2008).
Limitations
Limitations were associated with this study and its goal of determining whether
the FAA’s 2009–2011 RSP has reduced runway incursions at the five busiest U.S.
airports. One limitation was that the study was limited to only three dependent
variables—types, severity, and phases of flight for runway incursions at these airports.
Although I focused on the three critical elements associated with every runway incursion,
a broader study considering a larger number of variables could provide even more
information regarding runway incursions and the FAA’s efforts at reducing them.
An additional limitation of this study was that it was specific to the five busiest
U.S. airports. To address the problem of runway incursion throughout the United States,
it would be helpful for future researchers to assess all runway incursions at all towered
airports in the nation. This study only pertained to the five busiest U.S. airports. At these
five airports, professional pilots working for an airline predominantly conduct large
commercial aircraft passenger and cargo operations. These complex airport environments
necessitate that only highly qualified and experienced air traffic controllers are working
at these five locations. These highly qualified and experienced air traffic controllers and
predominantly professional pilots are different from the general aviation pilots and air
traffic controllers who operate at smaller towered airports geographically located
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throughout the United States. As such, evaluating runway incursions at the nation’s
busiest airports was different from at many other smaller airports throughout the nation.
Reducing runway incursions at these other towered airports is also important as a
part of reducing runway incursions throughout the United States. Because these smaller
airports, which primarily accommodate general aviation aircraft, involve fewer passenger
boardings as well as aircraft movements, they are different from the flight operations that
occur at the nation’s five busiest airports. As such, the results of this study do not present
an accurate measure of the effectiveness of the FAA’s 2009–2011 RSP across the nation
at all towered airports. Future researchers should address these smaller towered airports
located throughout the United States.
Delimitations
I addressed whether the FAA’s 2009–2011 RSP reduced runway incursions at the
nation’s five busiest airports; but, several significant delimitations existed. Delimitations
are restrictions within a study because of its design (Campbell & Stanley, 1966). I
addressed runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. Although runway
incursions can occur at any airport, this study pertained to the five busiest U.S. airports.
These five busiest airports represent a significant portion of the air traffic occurring
within the nation (FAA, 2014c). This study was further delimited by the fact that I sought
a correlation between only three elements associated with any particular runway
incursion. Specifically, I analyzed the types, severity, and phases of flight of runway
incursions both before and after the FAA’s RSP. Although a number of factors could
influence the occurrence of any given runway incursion, I addressed only these three
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elements. Finally, I explored runway incursions occurring only 3 years before and 3 years
after the 2009–2011 RSP. Although runway incursions occurred during the pendency of
the 2009-2011 RSP, these runway incursions were not included in this study. Each of
these delimitations may have curtailed the results of this study.
Significance of the Study
Runway incursions are a problem with global implications. Although the FAA has
worked through the RSP to reduce the number of runway incursions, the effectiveness of
the RSP at reducing runway incursions in regard to their type, severity, and phase of
flight remain unclear. Through this study, I sought to draw a correlation between runway
incursions’ type, severity, and phase of flight at the nation’s five busiest airports. I chose
to study the five busiest airports in this study because they represent approximately 25%
of the nation’s air traffic (FAA, 2014c), and the FAA has focused a significant portion of
its financial and technological resources at reducing runway incursions and increasing
safety as these airports (FAA, 2008). By increasing the understanding of the correlation
between these variables before and after the implementation of the FAA’s 2009–2011
RSP, I developed a more focused picture of the influence of the FAA’s RSP. The FAA’s
limited resources can be more effectively allocated in a manner that will result in an
increased effect on the improvement of aviation safety within the United States and
throughout the world.
I addressed the question of whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP reduced the number
of runway incursions at the nation’s busiest airports. This study fills a gap in the literature
associated with runway incursions in that it involved analysis of runway incursions from
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more than just a numerical perspective; I additionally considered runway incursions
regarding the type and severity during the phase of flight when it occurred. Not all
runway incursions have the same level of safety implications to the flying public (FAA,
2008). The information garnered from this study provides decision makers with an
increased understanding of the effectiveness of the methods employed by the FAA to
reduce runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. This knowledge will assist
the FAA, foreign governments, and other stakeholders in improving their aviation safety
programs designed to reduce runway incursions. By improving their runway safety
programs, the overall safety of the air travel system throughout the world will improve,
thus creating positive social change by improving human and social conditions relating to
air travel.
I evaluated the effectiveness of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP at the five busiest U.S.
airports. The conclusions drawn from this study will assist in reducing runway incursions
and, thereby, help improve the overall safety of the NAS as well as air traffic operations
around the world. Making aviation globally safer and reducing the risk for aviation
accidents for the flying public supports positive social change.
Implications for Social Change
Positive social change includes improving the quality of life for members of a
society through means of social, political, and economic modification. Aviation has
presented risks for the flying public throughout the world, including the potential for
serious injury and death (FAA Flight Standards Service, 2012). A runway incursion
represents a safety risk, which could jeopardize the safety of those using aviation as a
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means of travel (FAA, 2014d). By reducing runway incursions and decreasing the
inherent safety risks associated with aviation, society benefits in several significant ways.
People are more frequently using aviation as a means to travel from one place to
another. Aviation within the United States and around the world is expected to continue
to grow during the next several decades (FAA, 2015). As the number of flight operations
continues to increase, the inherent risk of a potential runway incursion also increases
(FAA, 2013a). As larger numbers of people travel, keeping these individuals safe is of
primary importance for all government and aviation stakeholders. Additionally, avoiding
aviation accidents has the potential of decreasing the overall cost of traveling within the
aviation system (Air Transportation Action Group, 2014), which would allow a larger
number of people throughout the world to travel by air.
Aviation also helps to stimulate the economies of many countries throughout the
world (Air Transportation Action Group, 2014). Tourism, air transport of goods, and
many aviation jobs are dependent on the safe operation of the aviation system (Air
Transportation Action Group, 2014, p. 2). Reducing the potential for runway incursions
and enhancing aviation safety will help improve the inherent safety of air traffic
operations throughout the world (FAA, 2014d) and support the growth and further
development of aviation. I identified whether the methods used by the FAA are reducing
runway incursions. This knowledge can be applied throughout the world when
developing and improving aviation safety systems designed to reduce runway incursions
globally. The implications resulting from this study have the potential of increasing
aviation safety, saving lives, and promoting positive social change. Ultimately, the results
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of this study will help decision makers worldwide make the right decisions when it comes
to how best to reduce runway incursions and improve aviation safety.
Chapter Summary
Solving runway incursions in the United States and around the world is not a
simple task. Chapter 1 provided an introduction to the research problem presented in this
dissertation. The chapter also provided a summary of the current studies in the area of
runway incursions, the underlying theoretical support for the study, and relevant
assumptions and limitations. I explored the nature and purpose of this study and
described how this study effectively to the body of knowledge in runway incursions and
aviation safety, thereby improving the overall safety of NAS and promoting positive
social change. Chapter 2 includes a review of the literature pertaining to this study.
Chapter 3 provides a discussion of the research design, including a description of the data
collection, the research procedure, and the statistical analysis used in the study. Chapter 4
provides the findings and the analysis of the collected data. Finally, Chapter 5 provides a
summary, conclusions, and recommendations relative to the study.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
I designed this study to evaluate whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP reduced
runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. This literature review includes an
exploration of literature on runway safety and the effect of runway incursions on aviation
safety. The aviation safety literature reviewed relates to runway safety on various
concerns and approaches for analyzing and improving runway safety within the United
States and throughout worldwide.
Governmental organizations, aviation stakeholders, and academics have
developed aviation safety literature in recent years. Aviation safety and more particularly,
runway safety, has been a continuing concern of the world’s governments, which seek to
improve the safety of their own countries’ aviation systems and operations. Because
governmental entities manage most runway safety programs, I first explored the literature
produced by governmental organizations. Next, I explored literature produced primarily
within the last 10 years by aviation stakeholders seeking improved aviation safety. I then
analyzed academic literature relating to runway safety in this context. GoogleScholar,
Academic and Business Premier were databases used to search for literature with key
search terms including aviation, airport, air traffic, safety, runway, general aviation,
runway incursion, operational error, pilot deviation, and government program
evaluation. This literature review concludes with an analysis of the literature on
government program evaluation, with an emphasis on impact evaluations using
comparison group, interrupted time-series design. A basic understanding of government
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program evaluation methodologies is instrumental in appreciating the quantitative
research methodology used in the data analysis of runway incursions at the nation’s five
busiest airports.
Governmental Aviation Safety Literature
Government literature created by a governmental agency or alternatively a study
directed by a governmental agency addresses the significance of runway incursions and
their potential disastrous implications on the NAS. In the United States, the FAA
predominately created these reports, as well as other interested federal government
agencies, such as the NTSB, GAO, OIG, and the Department of Transportation. These
governmental agencies have recognized the threat that runway incursions pose to the
nation’s NAS and have provided the FAA with recommendations to reduce runway
incursions. The FAA’s 2009–2011 National Runway Safety Plan addressed the
recommendations from the NTSB, the U.S. GAO, and the OIG for the Department of
Transportation (FAA, 2008, p. 15). Each of these governmental agencies, after
conducting independent studies, provided recommendations to the FAA to reduce the
frequency, types, and severity of runway incursions (FAA, 2008, p. 15). These
recommendations were incorporated into the FAA 2009–2011 RSP (FAA, 2008, p. 15).
National Transportation Safety Board
The NTSB (2015) is an independent federal agency charged by congress to
investigate and determine the probable cause of every civil aviation accident in the
United States. In their July 6, 2000, safety recommendation letter to the FAA (NTSB,
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2000), the NTSB suggested that runway incursions could be reduced if the FAA took the
following actions,
Require all airports to provide scheduled passenger service and install a
ground movement safety system that would provide direct warnings to
flight crews regarding potential runway incursions (NTSB, 2000, p. 16).
Amend Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations §91.129(i) (Aeronautics and
Space, 1962) to require that all aircraft runway crossings be authorized
only by ATC instructions or clearances, and further ensure that all
personnel assigned to move aircrafts and pilots operating aircrafts receive
adequate notification of the change in ATC procedures (NTSB, 2000, p.
16).
Amend FAA Order 7110.65 involving air traffic control procedures that
require aircrafts crossing multiple runways be issued ATC crossing
instructions for each runway after the aircrafts have crossed the previous
runway (NTSB, 2000, p. 16).
Mandate that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 121, 135 and 91
(Aeronautics and Space, 1962), as well as Subpart K aircraft operators
conduct arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based
on existing performance data, actual conditions, and incorporating a
minimum safety margin of at least 15% (NTSB, 2000, p. 16).
Each of these actions was designed to reduce runway incursions by modifying or
implementing new procedures, which the NTSB believed would be beneficial in
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increasing aviation safety within the NAS through the reduction of runway incursions.
Though the NTSB suggested these recommendations in 2000, the FAA first implemented
these in their 2008 RSP (FAA, 2008, p. 15).
Government Accountability Office
The U.S. GAO (2015) is an independent federal agency that investigates,
conducts evaluations, and performs audits for congress. The GAO investigates how
government agencies spend taxpayer monies to achieve their mandated duties. The GAO
has performed numerous evaluations of the FAA’s aviation safety programs and its
continuing efforts to improve the safety of the NAS. These evaluations have helped in
shaping the course that the FAA has taken in its endeavors to reduce runway incursions at
the nation’s airports.
In December 2007, the GAO released its report providing guidance to the FAA
regarding the agency’s efforts to reduce runway incursions. The GAO (2007) developed
its findings through a review of runway and ramp safety data, interviews conducted with
industry experts and FAA officials, as well as surveys of aviation experts (pp. 61–79).
The GAO findings were critical of the FAA’s methods for reducing runway incursions
(GAO, 2007). The GAO report made five recommendations to positively influence the
FAA’s efforts to reduce runway incursions throughout the United States (GAO, 2007).
1.

Create of an Office of Runway Safety that would develop and implement a
new national runway safety plan;

2.

Create a nonpunitive voluntary safety reporting system to encourage air
traffic controllers to disclose operational errors and deviations;
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3.

Collect data on runway overruns by aircraft that do not result in damage or
injury to analyze trends and causes of these types of incidents;

4.

Develop a plan for handling air traffic controllers overtime issues, which
focus on shift changes and incentives, to encourage transfers to locations
with higher volumes of traffic thereby necessitating significant rates of
controller overtime; and

5.

Enhance collaboration with the aviation industry and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration to develop methods to collect and
analyze ramp accidents and, if necessary, create a strategic plan designed
to reduce accidents involving passengers, workers, as well as the aircraft
in airport ramp areas. (GAO, 2007, p. 59)

Each of these recommendations was implemented by the FAA when developing its RSP
(FAA, 2008).
The GAO continued its audits of the FAA’s efforts to improve aviation safety and
reduce runway incursions (GAO, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014). The
GAO (2008a) found that the FAA’s progress on reducing runway incursions had been
impeded by a lack of leadership, challenges involving technology implementation, and
other problems. The GAO findings were based on surveys of experts regarding the causes
and measures to mitigate accidents, review of relevant safety data, and interviews of
industry and FAA officials (GAO, 2008a, p. 1). With knowledge of the increasing NAS
congestion and recent data indicating that runway incursions serve as precursors of
aviation accidents, the GAO (2008a) found that more needed to be accomplished by the
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FAA to reduce runway incursions (p. 1). Although the FAA has taken steps to reduce
runway incursions, a lack of leadership and coordination, technology challenges, data
limitations, as well as human factors have impeded the agency’s progress (GAO, 2008, p.
1). The GAO (2008a) found the development of leadership, overcoming technology
challenges and data limitations, as well as resolving human factors as measures necessary
for the FAA to overcome to achieve its runway safety goals (p. 13).
The GAO (2008b) found that even though the FAA had worked toward achieving
its goal of reducing runway incursions within the United States, the agency’s continued
efforts through changing airport layouts, improving runway signage, modifying airport
lighting and markings, as well as developing and implementing new technology designed
to increase situational awareness were essential for continued safety improvement (pp. 1–
2). The GAO (2008b) found that even though the FAA had implemented several methods
for scheduling air traffic controller shift changes to overcome human factor implications,
air traffic controllers were hesitant to self-report operational errors and deviations when
the possibility of discipline existed (p. 16). Additionally, air carriers have taken steps to
reduce the potential for runway incursions by educating their pilots on cockpit
distractions and how to avoid them (GAO, 2008b). The NTSB and the FAA have also
acknowledged that runway status lights (RWSL) would be helpful in reducing runway
incursions at the nation’s airports. The GAO noted that although the FAA had been
making progress to improve aviation safety, more still remained to be accomplished.
The GAO (2009) emphasized the importance of adequate and predicable funding
for the FAA to accomplish its safety goals. Using generally accepted government
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auditing standards through discussions with senior FAA officials and aviation industry
representatives, the GAO specified six primary areas of importance for increased aviation
safety and the continued development of a safer NAS. These areas of primary importance
included (a) NextGen: implementing existing and current technologies while providing
incentives for the acquisition of these technologies for airlines as well as enhancing
runways, thereby exploiting the advantages of NextGen technologies (GAO, 2009, pp. 1–
2); (b) safety: the FAA should increase aviation oversight, especially of runway and ramp
areas, through the use of improved aviation safety data (pp. 3–4); (c) mobility: the FAA
should decrease congestion through an increase of NAS capacity by reducing delays with
redesigned airspace and limiting flight operations (pp. 5–6); (d) environment: the FAA
should work on reducing emissions, noise, and other pollutants (pp. 7–8); (e) human
capital: the FAA should develop a fully trained workforce capable of implementing the
demands required by NextGen (pp. 9–10); and (f) timely reauthorization: timely
reauthorizations of FAA funding is essential to support continuing programs and ensure
the successful implementation of the NextGen provisions (pp. 11–12). Congress’ FAA
funding reauthorization occurred in 2012 (FAA, 2012).
The GAO (2012a) credited the FAA with taking the steps to improved aviation
safety data, but indicated that aviation safety risks still required immediate attention. The
GAO reached the conclusions in their report by reviewing earlier GAO work as well as
the actions of the FAA in response to the earlier GAO (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009)
aviation safety reports. In their report, the GAO (2012a) noted that in 2010, Congress
passed the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Extension Act, which addressed concerns
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for reducing safety risks through more effective FAA management. In responding to
congress’ concerns, the FAA has worked to implement new safety programs and used the
SMS, a risk-based aviation safety approach that incorporates data that helps in the
creation of effective policies, procedures, and accountabilities (GAO, 2012a, p. 13). The
GAO (2012a) suggested that the FAA focus increased attention on improving the quality
of its data, while recognizing that more work in aviation safety remained to be
accomplished by the FAA (p. 14).
In late 2012, congress requested that the GAO (2012b) perform an analysis of the
trends in general aviation accidents that have occurred between 1999 and 2011. These
trends, which included runway incursions, affect the overall safety of the NAS (GAO,
2012b, pp. 1–2). The GAO (2012b) developed its findings using generally accepted
government auditing standards through an analysis of NTSB accident data, interviews of
NTSB officials, members of the FAA and industry stakeholders, as well as a review of
government and industry studies (p. 37). In addition to the implementation of new
technologies, the GAO concluded that to improve general aviation safety, the FAA
required higher quality data of general aviation flight hours. The FAA was further
encouraged to establish general aviation performance measures necessary for the
development of a 5-year general aviation safety strategy (GAO, 2012b). As the
importance of general aviation on the NAS continues to increase, an increased FAA
understanding and effective regulation of general aviation is necessary for reducing
runway incursions and improving aviation safety throughout the NAS.
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The GAO (2013) concluded that the FAA does not have a comprehensive riskbased process for the effective reporting of aviation safety issues. The GAO
recommended that the FAA implement improved data collection methods and analysis
focused on runway and ramp safety, airborne operational errors, and the development of
more information regarding general aviation flight hours and training (GAO, 2013, pp. 4–
5). Although the GAO (2013) recognized that the FAA has moved toward higher levels
of safety, the agency still faces challenges in other aviation safety areas (pp. 5–10).
The GAO (2014) reviewed SMS implementation progress at the FAA and within
the aviation industry. The GAO explored the challenges affecting the implementation of
SMS and received recommendations from stakeholders regarding how the deployment of
SMS could be enhanced (GAO, 2014, pp. 1-3). The GAO (2014) used generally accepted
government auditing standards when conducting research through the review of FAA
documents and interviewing FAA officials and 20 selected aviation stakeholders,
including air carriers, repair stations, manufacturing firms, and certificated airports (pp.
31–34). The GAO established that confusion still existed by stakeholders regarding the
SMS oversight strategy. Many aviation safety inspectors needed additional training in
SMS procedures as well as an improved understanding of the agency’s procedures so that
consistent interpretation would occur with regulatory enforcement (GAO, 2014). The
GAO found that stakeholders believed that the FAA’s collaboration and training were
good, but could be improved and that SMS training provided by the FAA for
stakeholders would be helpful. The GAO (2014) recommended that the FAA establish a
plan for SMS implementation with a plan for the training and guidance of the agency’s
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aviation safety inspectors while they perform their regulatory duties. Accomplishing the
efficient implementation of SMS would serve as a tool for further reduction of runway
incursions and an increase in aviation safety throughout the NAS.
Office of the Inspector General
The OIG is a component of the U.S. Department of Transportation and an
independent auditing group responsible for reporting problems and making
recommendations (based on audits, investigations, and inspections) to the secretary of
transportation and to congress (OIG, n.d.). In a report on the FAA’s progress toward the
reduction of runway incursions, the OIG (2010) assessed the actions taken by the agency
to identify and correct the underlying causes of recent runway incursions as well as
address those issues that could affect aviation safety throughout NAS. The OIG
recommended that the FAA take six actions to help in the nationwide reduction of
runway incursions:
Establish initiatives to promote increased voluntary pilot participation in
the Runway Incursion Information Evaluation Program and ensure the
analysis of data collected to identify and mitigate runway incursion causal
factors;
Collaborate with the pilot and airline communities to establish a process
whereby regional RSP managers can request site-specific redacted
Aviation Safety Action Plan information on runway incursions and surface
incidents to aid in identifying trends, root causes, and possible local
solutions;
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Develop an automated means to share local best practices that were
successful in reducing runway incursions;
Establish appropriate milestones for implementing JANUS, National Air
Traffic Professionalism Program and Crew Resource Management
training, and tower simulator training technologies at airport traffic control
towers that have a history of a high number of runway incursions caused
by controller operational errors;
Require a safety risk analysis to evaluate existing operational procedures
at airports where the FAA has identified potential runway safety risks and
train appropriate personnel in conducting such analysis; and
Require each line of business within the FAA to include quantitative goals
in its annual business plan for reducing runway incursion risks specific to
oversight responsibilities. Designate the Runway Safety Office as the
authority to review and approve all runway safety initiatives. (OIG, 2010,
p. 2).
The OIG’s (2010) recommendations promote increased collaboration between
aviation industry stakeholders and encourage improved safety risk analysis, better
training, and the sharing of best practices designed to increase aviation safety and reduce
runway incursions at the nation’s airports.
International Governmental Runway Incursion Literature
In addition to the literature provided by federal government agencies,
international governmental organizations have also been helpful through their efforts to
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reduce runway incursions. These international organizations represent the many countries
that have struggled to reduce runway incursions occurring within their nations. Their
efforts have led to the development of literature regarding the global threat and
worldwide challenge seeking the reduction of runway incursions and increasing aviation
safety. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (2004) concluded that a majority of
runway incursions were because of communication problems between the air traffic
controller and another party, most often the pilot. The ICAO (2002), a component of the
United Nations, emphasized human factors and organizational issues of airline
maintenance operations and how such improved procedures could be beneficial in
reducing runway incursions throughout the world. The ICAO’s engagement in this
endeavor has also served as a catalyst for other organizations’ safety efforts.
The International Air Transport Association (2006) examined the human,
technical, environmental, and organizational components associated with its accident
classification system and underlying aviation risk assessment. Although researchers have
evaluated the ways to reduce the number of runway incursions, several have specifically
focused on reducing runway incursions by applying technological advancements
(Horowitz & Santos, 2009; Schonefeld & Moller, 2012).
Nongovernmental Aviation Safety Literature
In several nongovernmental aviation safety studies, researchers have concluded
that major U.S. airports are operating with unacceptable levels of risk because of their
inherent potential for runway incursions and their failure to adequately address these
safety concerns (ALPA, 2007; NTSB, 2010). Skorupski (2010) established that air
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transport is a complex system that must effectively combine advanced technical systems,
operators (air traffic controllers and pilots), and procedures (p. 45). Historically, aviation
safety risk has been identified by the number of aircraft accidents, which typically results
in a large number of casualties and huge financial loses for those involved (Skorupski,
2010, p. 45). Because of the significant exposure which could result from an aviation
accident, safety has remained an essential component in air transportation (Skorupski,
2010).
According to Skorupski (2010), the risks inherent in air traffic can be separated
into conscious and unconscious. Conscious risk occurs when, despite the possibility of
avoiding it, someone decides to engage in a risky action (Skorupski, 2010). Meanwhile,
unconscious or passive risk occurs independently of anyone’s will or decision
(Skorupski, 2010). Dependent on the nature and duration of the inherent safety threat, an
operator may have to deal with continuous, single, or cumulative risks. Air traffic
accidents are generally characterized with respect to risk and have several distinctive
features: (a) aircraft crew members and passengers are the most vulnerable to risk; (b)
accidents are rare events but have serious consequences; and (c) risk is always present in
aircraft operations and requires that noncumulative risk be properly addressed
(Skorupski, 2010, pp. 46–47).
Managing risk and safety effectively is a practical problem, which has historically
been addressed by examining the underlying causes of incidents and accidents,
identifying the risks associated with them, and then determining appropriate safety
standards consistent with socially acceptable values (Skorupski, 2010, p. 47). According
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to Skorupski (2010), a number of methods and models exist to consider the different
aspects of risk inherent in air transportation. The most advanced methods and models
frequently used involved studying the causes of actual incidents and accidents. A second
group of methods and models focused on the theoretical risk of possible collisions in air
transportation. A third group of methods and models focused on human error analysis,
which occurs because of errors by air traffic controllers and pilots. The fourth and final
group of risk analysis methods focused on third-party risk methods, which involve
considering the statistical risk of losing human life while on the ground through an
aircraft accident as compared to the inherent risk associated with the aircraft passenger
(Skorupski, 2010, p. 47).
Skorupski (2010) established that air traffic accidents are most often a
combination of many different factors. Skorupski (2010) focused his analysis on
evaluating only those additional factors that determine the creation of the accident for the
purpose of determining the statistical dependencies between a serious incident and the air
accident (p. 47). Skorupski concluded that it would be possible to estimate the number of
accidents solely based on the knowledge of the number of incidents on the presumption
that a serious incident results in an accident through only one additional adverse event (p.
53). As such, Skorupski asserted that a realistic forecasting model can be developed to
identify that number of accidents based on the number of incidents (serious incidents)
occurring in air traffic (p. 53).
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA; 2005), FAA (2009),
and European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL; 2010)
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concluded that the Runway Incursion Prevention and Alerting System (RIPAS) has the
potential to significantly decrease the number of runway incursions, thereby decreasing
the overall risk of an aviation accident (Jones & Prinzel, 2011). Some researchers have
concluded that even with RIPAS installations, general aviation will still pose an
unacceptable risk, affecting runway safety at many airports (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012).
Although an open question appears to exist regarding the eventual effect of RIPAS
(Chapin, 2010), the experience from the deployment of RWSL and the final approach
runway occupancy signal (FAROS) have established that direct visual clues at airports
significantly improve an airport’s overall runway safety (FAA, 2009).
Aviation safety literature supports the conclusion that new technologies could
have a beneficial effect on the reduction of runway incursions (Schonefeld & Moller,
2012). However, many of these technologies are expensive and require a significant
capital investment. Horowitz and Santos (2009) explored how policy makers could
approach technological improvements designed to cost-effectively improve runway
safety at their respective airports (p. 357). The objective of the Horowitz and Santos’
(2009) study was to identify the best ways to install technological improvements while
decreasing the rate of runway incursions and ensuring that current airport safety levels
are not adversely affected (p. 357). Utilizing a case study approach, Horowitz and Santos
(2009) concluded that the best way in which to introduce technological improvements
into an operational airport environment was by using the new technology initially as a
secondary airport safety system, which could then assist in the reduction of runway
incursions while still maintaining acceptable levels of airport safety (Horowitz & Santos,

49
2009, p. 357). In this manner, effective data collection regarding the technological
improvement could occur without increased risk to overall aviation safety (Horowitz &
Santos, 2009, p. 360).
The causal relationship between human factors and the occurrence of runway
incursions at the nation’s airports has been the central focus of several aviation safety
studies (Chang & Wong, 2012; International Air Transport Association, 2006; Rantanen,
Palmer, Wiegmann, & Musiorski, 2006). These studies have consistently concluded that
human error serves as a significant factor in most runway incursions.
Rantanen, Palmer, Wiegmann, and Musiorski (2006) identified human error as a
consistent and primary factor resulting in aviation accidents (p. 1221). The International
Air Transport Association (2006) concluded that a pilot’s years of flying, flying hours
and flying skills has an influence on their likelihood of having a runway incursion. Chang
and Wong (2012) analyzed runway incursions from the human perspective, concluding
that most runway incursions are the result of human error and that statistically pilot
deviations are the most significant causal factor in a majority of runway incursions (p.
25), with pilot error the primary cause of most runway incursions (p. 30). The FAA data
supported Chang and Wong’s conclusions that nearly 72% of runway incursions involve
pilot deviations while operating as general aviation aircraft (Chang & Wong, 2012, p.
25). As a result of their findings, Chang and Wong (2012) created a model for analyzing
human risk factors designing it as an effective tool to reduce runway incursions (p. 25).
Chang and Wong’s (2012) model established an overall ranking and relative
weighting of dimensions of the top 10 pilot risk factors resulting in runway incursions.
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These factors included (a) situational awareness, (b) runway/taxiway marking and signs,
(c) safety attitude, (d) communication between pilot and air traffic controller, (e)
communication skills, (f) fatigue/incapacitation, (g) pilot’s cross-check, (h) instruction
and read back between pilot and ATC, (i) airport illumination, and (j) runway incursion
prevention systems (Chang & Wong, 2012, p. 28). Each of these risk factors frequently
play a critical role in an eventual runway incursion.
Using Chang and Wong’s (2012) model to identify areas of potential runway
incursions on an airport by effectively identifying those pilot risk factors that could
potentially reduce runway incursions, thereby decreasing the number of potential runway
incursion accidents and reducing the risk of fatalities and financial lost by the airlines (p.
30). Chang and Wong also determined that there were significant differences between the
pilots’ viewpoints of those risk factors likely to result in runway incursions as compared
to the viewpoints of airline management experts. Pilots considered operational
deviations/negligence, a lack of teamwork and pilot fatigue as critical factors, while
airline management experts considered decision making ability, flight dynamics surface
guidance systems and runway incursion prevention systems as the primary factors
leading to runway incursions (Chang & Wong, 2012, p. 29). Pilots generally focused on
their core ability to interact with others, whereas airline management experts emphasize
the failure of ineffective interaction between pilots and hardware (Chang & Wong, 2012,
p. 29). From the experts’ viewpoint, most runway incursions could be most effectively
avoided with enhanced hardware assistance and improved liveware (Chang & Wong,
2012, p. 29).
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A system organization perspective has been utilized to understand the factors
influencing aviation safety as well as the causes and potential solutions of runway
incursions at the nation’s airports (Adam, Lentz, & Blair, 2002; Rogerson & Lambert,
2012). Adam, Lentz, and Blair (2002) studied factors claimed as positively influencing
the likelihood of a runway incursion occurring under a given set of circumstances. These
factors varied significantly in type and included such components as runway layout,
airport identifications, signage as well as the methods utilized for navigation and
communications among pilots, drivers, and controllers (Adam et al., 2002). Rogerson and
Lambert (2012) established a method for distinguishing levels of risk across a set of
locations on an airport utilizing multiple factor hierarchies (p. 22). This method avoids
averaging across experts and is thus useful for situations in which experts disagree and in
which an absence of expert consensus on the causative or contributing factors are
significant for risk management purposes (Rogerson & Lambert, 2012, p. 23). Rogerson
and Lambert’s research findings established that using experts’ perspectives on the
airport-specific factors could actually contribute to runway incursions. Their study
involved the analysis of 80 towered airports in the United States where experts identified
and weighed the relative influence of factors such as: airport geometry, operations,
weather, geography and the number of days since the last safety review in determining
the likelihood of a future runway incursion (Rogerson & Lambert, 2012, p. 22). By
analyzing these factors, a prediction of the relative likelihood of a runway incursion
occurring at a particular location could be effectively calculated (Rogerson & Lambert,
2012, p. 23).
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Through their detailed factor analysis, Rogerson and Lambert (2012) expanded
the scope of their research and developed a methodology for identifying, organizing, and
aggregating potential risks to a safety-critical system that could then be used to create a
protocol for the prioritization of protections against airport safety hazards (pp. 22–23).
Rogerson and Lambert’s (2012) methodology was designed to avoid the acceptance of
unfounded expert views by highlighting the effects of multiple complementary
perspectives on system organization while addressing the process of decision-making
under stakeholder-specific assessments of risk factor relationships (p. 23). Ultimately,
this modeling process could be effectively applied to a particular case study where more
productive training meetings would occur which were specifically designed to improve
the local airport runway safety environment (Rogerson & Lambert, 2012). As such,
Rogerson and Lambert asserted that particular airport runway safety problems could be
effectively resolved by identifying the indicator and causative factors and then
prioritizing which airports warrant special training or intervention by the program safety
office. In this manner, limited government resources could be more efficiently allocated
to those airports and locations where the resulting outcome would be more significant
(Rogerson & Lambert, 2012, p. 25). Those areas identified on an airport where a runway
incursion would be more likely to occur were called “hot spots” (Rogerson & Lambert,
2012, p. 25).
The concept of airport hot spots was a reflection on a similar concept within the
federal highway system, commonly referred to as “conflict points” (Federal Highway
Administration, 2010). Conflict points are locations where traffic accidents are more
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likely to occur, likewise hot spots are locations on airports where runway incursions or
accidents are more likely to happen (Rogerson & Lambert, 2012, p. 25). Because each
hot spot presents a potential location for a runway incursion, the higher the number of hot
spots at a particular airport, the higher the likelihood of a runway incursion (Rogerson &
Lambert, 2012, p. 25). Rogerson and Lambert (2012) further identified those factors that
would have an effect on the likelihood of a runway incursion (p. 26). These factors
included such aspects as airport culture, management style and method of communication
(Rogerson & Lambert, 2012, p. 26). Rogerson and Lambert (2012) organized 23 runway
incursion factors into a seven factor hierarchy to account for varying perspectives among
stakeholders on the particular emphasis factor and its relationship among the factors that
might be present at any given airport location (p. 33).
Kim and Yang (2012) took a different approach in identifying risk frequency of
hazards related to runway incursions. They developed an analytical hierarchal process
wherein 15 hazards were weighted in such a manner that the area with the highest score
was more likely to become an area where runway incursions would happen in the future
(Kim & Yang, 2012, p. 30). Kim and Yang (2012) established that hazards causing
runway incursions varied depending upon the airport’s environment and operational
characteristics (p. 31). The researchers further concluded that the largest contribution to
runway incursion was a “misunderstanding of ATC’s instructions,” followed by a
“momentary forgetting/confusion” of a clearance issued, misidentification of an
aircraft/vehicle or its location, and loss of situational awareness (Kim & Yang, 2012, p.
34). As such, training in these critical areas was essential in order to reduce the number of
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runway incursions. If runway incursion locations could be effectively identified, then
methods and technologies designed to reduce the chance of these runway incursions
happening at these locations in the future was critical.
Schonefeld and Moller (2012) provided a methodology for developing and
implementing technological responses designed to prevent runway incursions (p. 31).
From a theoretical perspective, runway incursion prevention technology has been
primarily premised on protective measures designed to inhibit those causes that
oftentimes lead to runway incursions and additionally provide timely alerts which make
pilots and others aware of a potential runway incursion. According to Schonefeld and
Moller (2012), previous and current studies have uniformly agreed that positive
situational awareness was a primary preventative key in avoiding runway incursions and
safely mitigating them should they occur (p. 35). If proper technological advancements
were made available and implemented by the airports, Jones and Young (2001) had
previously estimated an 80% reduction in runway incursions would result by effectively
enhancing the situational awareness of flight crews and air traffic controllers.
Schonefeld and Moller (2012) concluded that there were two basic approaches to
preventing runway incursions - avoid entering an active runway and timely detecting an
imminent runway incursion so that the situation could be effectively resolved (p. 35). The
ability to timely prevent a runway incursion has been frequently dependent on the type of
surveillance system that provides the information to the individual handling the runway
incursion problem (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012, p. 35). Previous research has also
supported that reliable, effective and accurate surveillance systems at airports, which
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effectively monitor aircraft movement areas, has had a positive influence on the reduction
of runway incursions (Jones, Quach, & Young, 2001; Jones & Young, 2001; Singh &
Meier, 2004: Squire, Barrow, Durkee, Smith, & Moore, 2010).
Determining which surveillance system best suites a particular airport
environment has been a relatively recent research topic. One type of surveillance system
designed to reduce runway incursions has been the Runway Incursion Prevention and
Alerting System (RIPAS). Stevens and Sanchez (2010) found that the integration of
RIPAS into the workflow of an air traffic controller (ATC) oftentimes depends on the
reliability of the surveillance technology. RIPAS is capable of immediately reacting to
aircraft route deviations that could result in a runway incursion and then providing direct
and timely situational information to both the flight crew and the air traffic controller in
order to prevent a runway incursion (Squire et al., 2010).
Theoretically, if RIPAS achieved its stated objective, then there should not only
be a decrease in the number of runway incursions as well as the events leading to
potential runway incursion, but also a corresponding decrease in the severity of the
runway incursion should also occur (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012, p. 36). This theory was
premised on the fact that aircraft traffic depends on a series of decisions by humans,
which without adequate information can result in poor outcomes (Schonefeld & Moller,
2012, p. 36). With the quality of information enhanced through effective technology,
poor decisions can be effectively minimized (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012, p. 36).
Schonefeld and Moller (2012) further asserted that any remaining poor decisions would
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be identified by surveillance technology and a sound warming alert would occur, thereby
further reducing the likelihood of a runway incursion (p. 36).
Studies from NASA (2005), FAA (2009), and EUROCONTROL (2010) also
concluded that technologies such as RIPAS and Runway Incursion Advisory and Alert
System (RIAAS) have the potential to significantly decrease the number of runway
incursions, thereby reducing the overall risk of an aviation accident (Jones & Prinzel,
2011). NASA (2005) research, conducted jointly by NASA Langley Research Center and
Rannoch Corporation, explored the potential safety advantages associated with the
implementation of RIASS. Similar to RIPAS, RIAAS provides alerts to pilots through an
aircraft-based alerting system (NASA, 2005, p. 1). The research was premised upon three
component parts, including an Airborne Research Integrated Experimental System
(ARIES), aircraft mission simulator and eight commercial airline crews (NASA, 2005,
pp. 7-8). These tests were conducted under various meteorological conditions utilizing
several cockpit technologies (NASA, 2005, p. 8) and also incorporated a pilot survey
regarding their opinions about the Runway Incursion Prevention System (RIPS).
The survey revealed that pilots unanimously felt that RIPS technology created a
safer cockpit environment, while 75 percent believed the alerts they received through
RIPS were timely and allowed them an adequate opportunity to effectively react to
pending aviation conflicts (NASA, 2005, p. 8). Meanwhile, the studies’ flight tests
established the reliability of the systems cross-runway alerting logic with only a small
number of missed alerts generally resulting from traffic ADS-B data interface problems
(NASA, 2005, p. 9). The research also utilized a simulator, which developed data through
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a series of standard runway incursion scenarios with real-time traffic (NASA, 2005, p. 9).
An analysis of the data established that RIAAS alerts provided adequate time for safe
evasive maneuvers (NASA, 2005, p. 10). NASA (2005) concluded that the integration of
RIAAS could reduce the risks associated with severe runway incursions (p. 13). It further
determined that RIAAS would have significant influence at airports without automated
aircraft ground movement surveillance systems (NASA, 2005, p. 13). Even at airports
with ground surveillance systems, substantial benefits resulted from RIAAS alerts to
pilots with a minimum number of false alerts when a conflict was not actually present
(NASA, 2005, p. 13). In conclusion, NASA (2005) research established that the RIAAS
aircraft alerting system was valid and effectively reduced runway incursions at airports,
thereby increasing runway safety (p. 13).
The FAA (2009) research focused on educating aviation stakeholders on
multifaceted approaches for the reduction of runway incursions at the nation’s airports.
As part of the study, more than 40 aviation leaders from various airports, airlines, pilot
unions, air traffic controllers, and aerospace manufacturers worked collectively to
identify those sections of the NAS which could be vulnerable to human error, thereby
increasing the chance of a runway incursion (FAA, 2009, p. 2). The stakeholders worked
collectively to improve cockpit and air traffic procedures, safety markings, airport
signage as well as technology and training (FAA, 2009, p. 8).
These stakeholders further addressed proposed FAA strategies for increased
improvement in runway safety (FAA, 2009, p. 8). Additionally, they recommended that
enhanced communications procedures be established between fellow cockpit
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crewmembers as well as more effective coordination with and between air traffic
controllers (FAA, 2009, p. 8). These stakeholders concluded that with more explicit taxi
instructions between controllers and flight crews, the levels of situational awareness and
control of aircraft movements on the airport will increase (FAA, 2009, p. 8).
Recommendations were also encourage for updates in applicable standards for airport
signage and markings (FAA, 2009, p. 8) as well as improved technological
implementation such as RIAAS or RIPAS within the cockpit and control towers (p. 9).
FAA (2009) emphasized the importance of timely implementation of runway
safety-enhancing technologies at airports throughout the United States (p. 9). These
technologies included Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X),
FAROS, and RWSL (FAA, 2009, p. 9).
Runway Status Lights alerts pilots to potential runway incursions using a system
of lights embedded into runway surfaces, which results in pilots obtaining enhanced
situational awareness and providing increased assistance in avoiding potential aircraft
accidents (FAA, 2009, pp. 22–23). The ASDE-X serves as a method of surface detection
equipment technology that enables air traffic controllers to detect potential runway
incursion conflicts before they occur (FAA, 2009). Additionally, the electronic flight bag
and airport moving map display provide pilots with information regarding a variety of
aviation topics and can improve situational awareness through increased surface safety.
Finally, FAROS uses flashing lights visible to pilots on approaching aircrafts to warn
them that the runway is occupied, thus preventing accidents and incursions on airport
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runways (FAA, 2009). By the end of 2011, each of the airports analyzed in this
dissertation had installed these technologies (GAO, 2013).
The impetus for EUROCONTROL (2010) was the significant number of runway
incursions that could potentially result in an aircraft accident. The study expressed
concerns that with increasing levels of air traffic throughout the world as well as an
increased pressure on efficient operations during all phases of flight, a growing threat of
aircraft incursions and accidents exists (EUROCONTROL, 2010, p. 9). With increased
concern regarding the whole airport environment, expanding the focus of airport surface
safety nets to include taxiways and airport apron areas and the introduction of integrated
surface safety net functions was important. Surface safety nets, which incorporate
technologies, such as RIAAS and RIPAS, alert air traffic controllers, flight crews, or
vehicle drivers to potentially hazardous situations in an effective manner with sufficient
warning time for the situation to be resolved (EUROCONTROL, 2010). Surface safety
nets rely on Airport Safety Roadmaps that build on operational requirements laid out by
ICAO and are supported by an operational analysis of key hazardous situations
(EUROCONTROL, 2010, p. 1).
The Roadmap for Airport Surface Movement Safety Nets was designed to
increase the coverage of hazardous situations for surface movements and provide direct
alerts to flight crews and vehicle drivers (EUROCONTROL, 2010). The surface safety
nets cover the complete airport movement areas, including taxiways and aprons, thereby
improving safety warnings to allow for effective and timely resolutions of pending
aircraft conflicts. EUROCONTROL (2010) found that surface safety nets enhance
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situational awareness while reducing breakdowns in communications and potential air
traffic controller errors.
As the research established, surface safety nets can effectively monitor the
distance between aircraft and vehicles on the airport surface area (EUROCONTROL,
2010). Generally, flying aircrafts have limited maneuverability in terms of sudden
changes in speed and direction of flight, while maintaining significant freedom in
initiating evasive action when necessary to avoid potential conflicts (EUROCONTROL,
2010, p. 7). Comparatively, aircrafts on the ground are more flexible in terms of adjusting
the direction and speed of their movement, but are limited to the airport’s available
taxiways and runways. In this regard, EUROCONTROL (2010) concluded that visibility,
airport layout, and available technological systems and procedures all play a significant
role in maintaining safety.
EUROCONTROL (2010) further concluded that even though surface safety nets
are useful for enhancing safety, the safety function is not independently sufficient and
further studies are needed to improve alerting performance within aircraft and control
towers (p. 9). Enhanced communication between the safety net function and flight crews
is an additional approach with significant potential for increasing airport safety
(EUROCONTROL, 2010, p. 9).
EUROCONTROL (2010) found other potential benefits with the implementation
of airport surface safety nets included a reduction in the risk of collisions between aircraft
and between aircraft and vehicles. Surface safety nets could further reduce the potential
damage caused to aircrafts involved in an aircraft, thereby reducing injuries and aircraft
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damage (EUROCONTROL, 2010). Surface safety nets assist in increasing the efficiency
of surface movements and mitigate the risks of operational disruptions. Additional
positive outcomes include an increase in the time available to identify actions necessary
to avoid a collision by instructing the effected flight crew or vehicle driver
(EUROCONTROL, 2010). EUROCONTROL (2010) finally established that automation
would effectively assist flight crews by improving their situational awareness and
reducing the prospect of detected hazards or operational errors. The researchers
acknowledged that future researchers of aircraft operational issues should consider pilot
and flight crew input, which would provide increased data to further enhance airport
safety (EUROCONTROL, 2010).
Schonefeld and Moller (2012) concluded that even with RIPAS installations,
general aviation will still pose an unacceptable risk, affecting runway safety at many
airports. As commercial aviation expands into airports used extensively by general
aviation aircraft, the risk of runway incursions will likely increase. Although an open
question exists regarding the eventual influence of RIPAS (Chapin, 2010), the experience
from the deployment of RWSL and FAROS have established that direct visual clues at
airports significantly improve an airport’s overall runway safety (FAA, 2009).
Schonefeld and Moller (2012) asserted that pilots should have the ability to
effectively avoid an inadvertent entry onto an active runway resulting in a runway
incursion. Jones and Young (2001) previously identified three significant factors
necessary for flight crews to avoid situations that could result in runway incursions.
These factors included pilots’ constant awareness of the location of their aircraft at an
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airport, an accurate understanding of the route that the aircraft was directed to travel by
ATC, and the ability to effectively detect and correct route deviations (Jones & Young,
2001). An accurate awareness of runway activity was also an influential factor in
avoidance of runway incursions (ICAO, 2007; Singh & Meier, 2004).
Consistent with Jones and Young (2001), Schonefeld and Moller (2012) identified
three factors that enhanced a pilot’s ability to timely detect a potential runway incursion.
These factors include an awareness of other traffic in the airport environment, a
continuing awareness of the aircraft’s location in the airport environment, and the activity
status of the operating runway (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012). If these factors are present,
the likelihood of a runway incursion decreases significantly (Schonefeld & Moller,
2012).
Surveillance sensors on an airport can also provide relevant and timely
information to both the controller and pilot regarding the aircraft’s location and its
current operating environment (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012). During a series of runway
incursion prevention system tests in 2000, the failure of a surveillance system to alert
pilots in time to avoid a runway incursion were most often caused by unreliability of the
Automatic Dependency Surveillance-Broadcast and Traffic Information Broadcast traffic
data (Cassell, 2005; Cassell, Evers, Sleep, & Esche, 2001; Green, 2002; Jones & Young,
2001). These inherent problems were predominantly corrected with the development of
RIPAS (Jones & Prinzel, 2011).
Garibay and Young (2013) analyzed airline operational strategies in an effort to
reduce general aviation accidents. Because the United States hosts the largest and most
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diverse general aviation community in the world, these strategies could prove beneficial
in reducing the large number of runway incursions happening in the general aviation
community (Doquette & Dorr, 2012; General Aviation Manufactures Association, 2010).
Compared to general aviation pilots, commercial pilots undergo more frequent training
and are required to complete mandated proficiency checks prior to providing services for
commercial operators, with most major airline carriers exceeding the minimum currency
and training requirements (ALPA, 2011).
Historically, general aviation accident rates have been more frequent than those of
the commercial airlines, as commercial flying has been one of the safest modes of
transportation, a recognition not shared with general aviation (Abu-Taieh, El Sheikh, &
Jafari, 2012; Shetty & Hansman, 2012). Shetty and Hansman (2012) asserted that one
possible explanation for this disparity was the difference in operational style between
general aviation and commercial airlines. Garibay and Young (2013) contended that it
might be possible to improve general aviation safety through the adoption of the best
practices utilized by the commercial airlines. This higher level of safety can be explained
by the fact that both airline pilots and dispatchers were held jointly responsibility for the
safety of every flight (see Aeronautics and Space, 1962; Krause & Jansen, 2014), and
were also better organized and had many more resources than general aviation. Because
general aviation is composed of a wide range of operations, such as crop-dusting, banner
towing, and personal flying (Air Safety Institute, 2010; General Aviation Manufactures
Association, 2010), focusing on improving safety protocols in general aviation by
determining how general aviation can use airline operational strategies could potentially
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be helpful in reducing runway incursions and improving aviation safety (Garibay &
Young, 2013, p. 2).
Because flight plan quality and flexibility, available resources, as well as
governmental regulations are the primary differences between general aviation and
commercial operations (Garibay & Young, 2013), general aviation should take specific
actions. These actions include (a) embracing in-cockpit technology, which would
encourage safer operations and also permit reliable data collection regarding general
aviation trends for data-driven decision making; (b) offering incentives for pilots to
undergo quality recurrent and safety training, while also eliminating loopholes or
shortcuts that compromise safety; and (c) implementing a system of checks and balances
to ensure that pilots have a sufficient safety net from human error (Garibay & Young,
2013, p. 15). Garibay and Young (2013) asserted that by incorporating these basic actions
into general aviation’s flight operations, general aviation’s safety record could be
improved.
As research continues on the development of aviation safety strategies designed to
reduce runway incursions, one of the most promising programs that could improve
aviation safety is the FAA’s concept of flight operations for the Next Generation Air
Transportation System, commonly referred to as NextGen (FAA, 2011a). NextGen is the
transition from the current ground-based navigation system to a satellite-based one that
relies on the use of a combination of technologies (GAO, 2012b). One of these new
technologies would notify pilots at all times of the precise location of other airplanes
around them, thereby increasing situational awareness and enhancing safety (McHale,
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2010). This enhanced situational awareness would likely be helpful in reducing the
number of runway incursions throughout the United States.
Aviation safety literature has pertained to the cause, the potential outcomes of
runway incursions, and ways in which runway incursions could be reduced or avoided
through new aviation procedures as well as the installation of new safety technology.
Government agencies, both foreign and domestic, various aviation stakeholders, and
aviation safety researchers have primarily produced aviation literature. Numerous
methods to identify probable causes of runway incursions and ways to prevent them have
resulted in the development of a number of procedural and technological advancements
designed to eliminate or reduce runway incursions at the nation’s airports. Continuing
research in the areas of runway incursions throughout the world will be helpful in better
identifying the causes of runway incursions as well as developing and implementing
procedures that are more advanced and technologies that will be beneficial in reducing
runway incursions. The research developed from this quantitative dissertation provides
needed information to further enhance the FAA’s RSP and thereby more effectively
reduce runway incursions.
Program Evaluation Methods
Significant in evaluating any government program is the selected program
evaluation method (Mertens & Wilson, 2012). Evaluation analyzes a program and its
objectives, asks whether these objectives have been achieved, and further identifies the
value of continuing the current program or developing a new, more useful one that will
better achieve the intended objective of the project (Rossi & Freeman, 1993). Identifying
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the components of an effective evaluation as well as the potential methods through which
it can best be accomplished provides the relevant context that supports the evaluation
methodology utilized in this dissertation.
Experts have agreed that an evaluation should not only assess program results, but
also identify ways in which to improve the evaluated program (Wholey, Hatry, &
Newcomer, 2010). Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2009) identified different levels of
evaluation and how these levels could integrate evaluation data and thereby provide
beneficial results to those who might rely on the results. Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick
(2009) identified four levels of evaluation as (a) Level 1: Reaction, or participant
impressions; (b) Level 2: Learning, or learning acquired; (c) Level 3: Behavior, or the
application of the learning; and (d) Level 4: Results, or the extent that targeted outcomes
occur for the company agency or school system. Utilizing these levels in program
analysis would assist in properly analyzing the effect of a program. At the end of a
program cycle, the evaluation findings should then be used to determine whether to alter
or maintain the program operations (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). The results from this
research study provide relevant data that supports the continuance of the FAA RSP but
suggest areas in which it could be improved.
Different types of program evaluations entail different outcomes. Evaluations
focused on examining and changing processes as they occur are called formative
evaluations, whereas evaluations focused on reporting what occurred at the end of the
program cycle are called summative evaluations (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011, p. 16).
Contrary to a formative evaluation, which involves examining a program in progress, a
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summative evaluation is an assessment of the program’s overall effectiveness (Boulmetis
& Dutwin, 2011, p. 60). Researchers need to select the appropriate program evaluation
method to obtain the desired and relevant information from a program analysis.
The program evaluation of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP is a summative evaluation
designed to obtain information regarding the impact of the RSP to effectively reduce
runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. Since the effectiveness of the RSP
is at issue in this dissertation, I reviewed the FAARSP’s effectiveness within the context
of a summative evaluation. Since each of the five busiest airports in the nation had the
latest technological advancements in place during the pendency of 2009–2011 RSP
(GAO, 2008b), these airports served as a bellwether for the effectiveness of the FAA’s
overall RSP. Understanding the relationship between the types, severity, and phase of
flight of runway incursions before and after the FAA RSP is helpful in determining if the
RSP effectively reduced runway incursions.
When conducting an effective evaluation, a researcher needs to understand both
the political and social climate that exists within the government program (Boulmetis &
Dutwin, 2011). Several different ways exist through which a program can be structured,
including the transactional approach (Rippey, 1973), the goal-free approach (Scriven,
1991), as well as the goal-based evaluation approach (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). Other
models that researchers have developed to assist with evaluations include the systems
analysis model developed by Rivlin (1971), the art criticism model developed by Eisner
(1997), and the adversary model developed by Owens (Madaus, Scriven, & Stufflebeam,
1993).
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Rippey (1973) identified the transaction model, which focuses on activity
occurring between the evaluator, the participant, and significant project staff. The
beneficiaries of this method of evaluation are the clients and practitioners (Boulmetis &
Dutwin, 2011, p. 106). This model integrates process evaluation with effective
monitoring through a continuous interchange of information between the evaluator and
staff, in which the evaluator is an active participant who provides feedback throughout
the process (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). The transaction goal-based model meanwhile
involves the use of subjectivity, as opposed to objectivity, in its analysis of a program
(Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011).
Scriven (1991) developed the goal-free evaluation model to evaluate a program’s
actual effect on the needs identified. This evaluation method entails examining the steps a
program has taken to address the particularized needs of the client population (Boulmetis
& Dutwin, 2011, p. 104). Though the goal-free model is difficult to use for conducting
evaluations when the evaluator is part of the program, it is a popular method because a
researcher can effectively utilize it in a program with many simultaneously occurring
projects (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). After the collection of the data, conclusions are
drawn by the evaluator regarding the effect of the program on satisfying the needs of the
client (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). When the evaluator is looking at actual effects rather
than anticipated effects for which quantitative tools have been designed, the goal-free
model is preferable, especially in qualitative evaluations (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011).
Alternatively, Provus’ (1971) discrepancy evaluation model can be effectively
used in situations in which an understanding exists that the program does not work
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independently but instead is part of a complex organizational structure. When the focus is
not to establish a cause-and-effect relationship but instead to only adequately understand
the evidence to make reasonable assumptions about cause and effect relationships, this
model is most effective (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011, p. 102). This model assists in the
decision-making process when decisions are based on the difference between present
standards and what actually exists (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). The strength of this
model lies in the staff being involvement in determining and using the evaluation criteria
and standards, which is helpful to program staff who have an evaluator working with
them from the beginning of program (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011).
Researchers frequently use Madaus, Scriven, and Stufflebeam (1993) decisionmaking model as a tool to make decisions regarding the future use of a program. With the
decision-making model, increased concern exists regarding a program’s long-term effects
and less with how the program is currently performing (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011, p.
107). As such, the decision making model focuses on decisions that will need to be made
in the future. The actual methodology used to collect data can vary significantly with
both quantitative methods, such as tests and records, and qualitative methods, such as
interviews, observations, and surveys utilized for data collection depending on what the
sponsor desires to know to make a decision (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). Though
researchers can use the decision-making model to structure formative evaluations, they
can also use the model effectively for summative evaluations (Boulmetis & Dutwin,
2011).
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Meanwhile, the systems analysis model pertains to a program using a systemic
method to studying the input, throughput, and output of a program (Boulmetis & Dutwin,
2011, p. 108). This evaluation model is frequently utilized to analyze whether a program
is getting individuals through a particular program in an efficient manner, as well as
whether the program is achieving its goals (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). Alternatively,
with the art criticism model, the evaluator, who is a qualified expert in all aspects of the
program, becomes an expert judge on the program’s operation (Boulmetis & Dutwin,
2011, p. 108). The evaluator’s ability to judge objectively determines the effectiveness of
the model. Generally, this evaluation model is employed when a critical review of a
program is necessary prior its application for funding or accreditation (Boulmetis &
Dutwin, 2011).
Another program evaluation method is the adversary evaluation model, in which
the evaluator establishes a jury who will evaluate evidence developed from individuals on
particular program aspects (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011, p. 109). The jury then judges the
evidence using applicable criteria to determine what is actually occurring in the program
(Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). When differing views exist between clients, staff,
community members, or sponsors of what is occurring in a program, this model can
effectively resolve the differences (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011).
Scriven (1991) described a goal-based evaluation as “any type of evaluation based
on and knowledge of—and reference to—the goals and objectives of the program,
person, or product” (p. 178). This method, also known as the objective attainment
method, is frequently used because of its ease in conducting the program evaluations.
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Usually based on stated objectives or goals identified in a proposal, brochure, or other
program description, this goal-based evaluation method is not concerned with ancillary
items, variables, or occurrences that might be spin-off products of the program activities
as opposed to the specifically stated objectives (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011, p. 109). In
this method, the evaluator seeks to measure specific outcome variables using quantitative
or qualitative methods.
Similar to the goal-based model, researchers can effectively utilize the impactbased evaluation model to determine whether a particular program has achieved its
desired impact. With most impact evaluations, the researcher seeks to isolate the effects
of a particular program to provide decision makers with the ability to determine whether
a program should be continued, expanded, or modified (Henry, 2010, p. 125). This model
relies on comparative data from before and after the program to determine the program’s
influence on achieving its stated objectives (Henry, 2010). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
and Holland (1986) established the theoretical base for using a comparative group design
when analyzing the effect of policy and programs. Researchers have utilized impact
evaluations using quantitative estimates between comparative groups when establishing
the causal effects of programs (Henry, 2010). More specifically, using an interrupted
time-series design is appropriate for longitudinal studies where data exists for before and
after the implementation of the program (Henry, 2010).
When evaluating the effect of government-based programs, researchers of
comparison group studies have regularly utilized an interrupted time-series design
(Biglan, Ary, & Wagenaar, 2000; Bloom, 2003; Bloom & Riccio, 2005; Dee & Jacobs,
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2011; Henry & Gordon, 2003; Penfold & Zhang, 2013). Henry and Gordon (2003)
utilized an interrupted time-series design when evaluating the effect of a public
information campaign designed to reduce air pollution. Biglan, Ary, and Wagenaar
(2000) advocated the use of comparison group interrupted time-series experiments when
conducting community intervention research. Penfold and Zhang (2013) asserted that the
interrupted time-series design worked effectively as a tool for evaluating quality
improvement (impact) of a program, especially health care quality improvements. Bloom
(2003) provided guidance regarding the effective use of a comparison group interrupted
time-series design when measuring the influence of school reform. Dee and Jacob (2011)
used a comparison group interrupted time-series design to effectively measure the effect
of No Child Left Behind legislation on student achievement. Finally, Bloom and Riccio
(2005) utilized a comparison group interrupted time-series analysis to evaluate the effect
of an employment program for public housing residents. Using a comparison group
interrupted time-series design to evaluate the effect of the FAA RSP is beneficial when
seeking to determine the program’s impact on the reduction of runway incursions.
In using an impact-based interrupted time-series design, I sought to determine
whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP effectively reduced runway incursions at the nation’s
five busiest airports. The goal of the FAA RSP was to reduce the number of runway
incursions at the nation’s airports (FAA, 2008). It accomplished this objective by
measuring the specific outcome variables of the RSP. Specifically, it analyzed the types,
severity, and phases of flight of runway incursions both before and after the FAA RSP.
Understanding the relationship between these variables before and after the RSP is
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important in assisting decision makers in determining whether the RSP should be
modified in future years.
Though a variety of program evaluation methods exist, many evaluators will
conduct their evaluations without strictly following any particular model of evaluation
and rely on their personally developed evaluation philosophy, plans, and procedures
(Worthen, 1990). Ultimately, the value of an evaluation model is premised on its ability
to assist evaluators in providing sources of new ideas and techniques, which serves as
mental checklists of those things that the evaluator should considered, remember, or be
concerned about (Worthen, 1990, p. 46). A model’s value as prescriptive guidelines for
doing evaluation studies is less significant (Worthen, 1990).
Chapter Summary
Chapter 2 presented the relevant literature available on aviation safety, runway
incursions, and government program evaluation literature. Governmental organizations
both in the United States and from around the world produced the majority of the aviation
safety literature. In the worldwide literature, researchers have universally recognized the
global threat posed by runway incursions to aviation safety as a significant problem
requiring immediate effective solutions. Struggling with the most effective and efficient
ways to solve this problem has been an ongoing debate identified throughout the
literature. In the aviation safety literature, researchers consistently described the threats
associated with runway incursions but have not identified the best way to predict runway
incursions or how best to prevent or reduce their potential risk in the first place. In much
of the government, stakeholder, and academic research literature, researchers sought to
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more fully explain the critical factors associated with runway incursions and identify the
best methods through which runway incursions could be effectively reduced through the
use of technology, alternative air traffic control procedures and training.
Chapter 3 presents the methodology of this research study, which is premised on
the literature review in Chapter 2. I describe the study methodology in this chapter.
Chapter 3 also expands the description of the research design and the methods of analysis
used in addressing the research question.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
When evaluating the effectiveness of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP at the five busiest
U.S. airports, a summative, impact-based evaluation to analyze runway incursions that
happened before and after the implementation of the RSP was appropriate. A summative
evaluation entails a focus on the effects or outcomes of a particular project (Rossi,
Lipsey, & Freeman, 2004). According to Trochim (2006), a summative evaluation can be
divided into several different categories, including outcome evaluations, impact
evaluations, cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit analysis, secondary analysis, and metaanalysis. Using an impact-based evaluation, the researcher seeks to determine the effect a
program had in achieving its stated goals and objectives (Henry, 2010).
In this study, a summative, impact-based evaluation was the most appropriate
method to evaluate the effectiveness of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP because I considered
the relationship between the types, severity, and phases of flight of runway incursions
that have occurred before and after the implementation of the RSP. Specifically, I sought
to determine whether the same types, severity, and phases of flight runway incursions
continue to occur after the completion of the 2009–2011 RSP. If so, then the RSP has not
reduced the runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports and has failed to
achieve the RSP stated goals and objectives. Alternatively, if positive change occurred in
the types, severity, and phases of flight of runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest
airports after the 2009–2011 RSP, then the program effectively reduced runway
incursions at these airports. The conclusions drawn from this study determine whether the
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FAA 2009–2011 RSP achieved its targeted impact of reducing runway incursions at the
nation’s five busiest airports. If not, decision makers should consider a re-evaluation of
the RSP and the consideration of alternative safety methods designed to reduce runway
incursions.
The outcome of this impact-based evaluation has a significant determination
regarding whether the FAA RSP should continue in its current form. If the RSP has been
effective, then further improvements and additional federal funding could be beneficial in
further reducing runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. Alternatively, if
the RSP has been ineffective at positively changing the types, severity, and phases of
flight of runway incursions, then future researchers need to explore alternative safety
methods designed to achieve a reduction in runway incursions. The FAA must take the
steps necessary to ensure that safety in the NAS is properly maintained (FAA, 2010).
This study provided information that could be instrumental in the development of future
runway safety programs.
When assessing the effectiveness of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP, a process that
compares the runway incursions before and after the program’s implementation was
necessary. A comparison group, interrupted time-series design was appropriate for this
longitudinal study as data exists that I used to compare the effect of the RSP before and
after the implementation of the RSP (Henry, 2010, p. 135). Comparative group design
studies are appropriate when analyzing the effect of policy and programs (Holland, 1986;
Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Researchers have used impact evaluations when analyzing
quantitative estimates between comparative groups to identify the causal effects of a
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program on variables (Henry, 2010). The FAA data that describes the types, severity, and
phases of flight for runway incursions occurring before and after the implementation of
the RSP were used for this quantitative analysis, thereby allowing me to assess the effect
of the RSP and establishing its effectiveness for reducing runway incursions.
I analyzed all runway incursions occurring at the five busiest U.S. airports for a
period of 3 years before the implementation of the program (October 1, 2005 through
September 30, 2008) and the 3-year period after the implementation of the program
(October 1, 2011, through September 30, 2014). The 3 years during the pendency of the
program were excluded from the analysis. Because I focused on the five busiest U.S.
airports based upon total passenger boardings and aircraft movements, I analyzed FAA
data applicable to these events.
Research Design and Approach
To assess the effectiveness of the FAA’s 2009–2011 RSP, a process that
compares the runway incursions before and after the RSP’s implementation was
necessary. To complete this assessment, a comparative group, interrupted time-series
design was used to compare data from before and after the completion of the RSP. A
comparative group, interrupted time-series design is most appropriate when evaluators
wish to assess the effect of programs on their intended outcomes (Henry, 2010; Holland,
1986; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Comparison group designs represent alternatives to
randomized experiments when the goal of the evaluation is to provide a quantitative
estimate of the causal effects of a program (Henry, 2010, p. 125). The comparative
groups for this study were the runway incursions occurring 3 years before the
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implementation of the 2009–2011 RSP and those occurring 3 years after the completion
of the program. The purpose of most impact evaluations is to isolate the effects of a
program to help decision makers decide whether the program should be continued,
improved, or expanded (Henry, 2010, p. 125).
I used a comparison group, interrupted time-series design to assess the effect of
the FAA 2009–2011 RSP on their goal of reducing runway incursions in regard to the
type, severity, and phase of flight of each of the runway incursions. In this study, I
conducted a comparison using descriptive statistics of runway incursions occurring
before and after the implementation of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP. Descriptive statistics
are generally used to numerically describe a group of people, events, work, or other
concepts (NcNabb, 2008). A comparison group design provides an alternative to
randomized experiments when the goal of the evaluation is to provide a quantitative
estimate of the causal effects of a program (Wholey et al., 2010). In this evaluation, the
intended outcome was to determine whether the FAA RSP was able to positively change
the types, severity, and phases of flight of runway incursions.
Publically available FAA data on all runway incursions throughout the United
States occurring between October 1, 2005 and September 30, 2014 was procured directly
from the FAA. These data were available and provided by the FAA in an Excel format.
The information on each runway incursions includes date and time of occurrence,
location (by airport), weather conditions, type of incursion, severity of incursion, aircraft
type and category, phase of flight, and narrative description information of each runway
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incursion. The FAA is the federal government agency charged with identifying,
evaluating, and reporting runway incursions occurring in the United States (FAA, 2010).
The FAA has identified and described their source of data in the compilation of
runway incursions occurring in the United States. The primary source of runway
incursion reports has come from air traffic controllers and pilots (FAA Performance
Measure Profile [FPMP], 2013). The data from these runway incursions are recorded in
the Comprehensive Electronic Data Analysis Reporting system. Preliminary incident
reports are evaluated when received, and evaluations can take up to 90 days to complete
(FPMP, 2013). Operations data used to calculate runway incursion rates were provided
by OPSNET, which I downloaded directly from the FAA operations and performance
data database (FPMP, 2013).
The FAA has addressed the issue of completeness of its runway incursion data.
The FAA stated that
The data are typically not finalized for 90 days following the close of the fiscal
year. Surface event reports are reviewed on a daily basis to determine if the
incident meets the definition of a runway incursion. Runway incursions are a
subset of the incident data collected and the completeness of the data is based on
the reporting requirements and completeness for each of the incident types.
(FPMP, 2013, p. 2)
The FAA and other agencies have generally used annual runway incursion incident data
to provide a statistical basis for research, analysis, and outreach initiatives (FPMP, 2013).
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Setting and Sample
The FAA RSP is a national program implemented to reduce runway incursions
throughout the United States. Through this study, I focused on runway incursions at the
five busiest U.S. airports. All runway incursion data from these five airports for the
relevant period of time were analyzed as a part of this study. The five busiest U.S.
airports were identified based on total passenger boardings and total aircraft movements
for the fiscal year (FAA, 2014c). A passenger boarding occurs when a passenger gets
onto an aircraft and departs from that airport (FAA, 1999). An aircraft movement occurs
each time an aircraft either lands or takes off from an airport (FAA, 1999). The five
busiest airports in relationship to passenger boardings and aircraft movements for
calendar years 2011 through 2013 were ATL, ORD, LAX, DFW, and DEN. The
passenger boardings and aircraft movements at the five busiest airports represent a
significant portion of all passenger boardings and aircraft movements that occur annually
in the United States (FAA, 2014c). The implications of runway incursions and FAA
efforts to effectively reduce them at these five airports are critical for the overall safety of
the NAS.
Addressing Bias
In all research, the potential exists that biases can negatively affect the study’s
results. As such, researchers should engage in the objective collection of data and seek a
fair and impartial interpretation of the results by participating in “reflexivity, which
means that the research actively engages in critical self-reflection about his or her
potential biases and predispositions” (Johnson, 1997, p. 284). I sought to determine
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whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP reduced runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest
airports. This quantitative study served to answer this question via analysis of the
relationship between the types, severity, and phases of flight of runway incursions before
and after the implementation of the 2009–2011 RSP at the five busiest U.S. airports.
I used the quantitative data to analyze the relationship between the variables in
this study, collected by the FAA. In their collection process, the FAA took steps to ensure
the reliability and completeness of their runway incursion data (FPMP, 2013). McNabb
(2004) defined archival data research as a way of reviewing published or previously
prepared data. Consistent with archival data research, all relevant FAA datasets in this
study were already derived, published, and reported in official government records
(McNabb, 2004). As such, the risk associated with biased data collection negatively
affecting the outcome of the study was less significant than in other types of research
(McNabb, 2004).
Maintaining independence in data collection and processing is important. Yin
(2008) suggested that the ability of a researcher to remain open to contrary findings can
reduce the possibility of the inadvertent introduction of substantial bias into a study (p.
72). In this study, I planned to avoid the introduction of bias by keeping an open mind
regarding any potential outcomes, thereby reducing the potential for biases to negatively
affect the results of this study.
Data Collection and Analysis
I entered the FAA runway incursion data into SPSS version 22.0 for Windows.
These FAA data were collected from runway incursions occurring from October 1, 2005
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through September 30, 2014. Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was granted
prior to the start of any research related to data collection. IRB provided the following
approval number: 06-24-16-0055329. The runway incursion data generated during the
pendency of the 2009–2011 RSP (10/01/2008 through 09/30/2011) were excluded from
the dataset. Thus, I only assessed data from 3 years before and 3 years after the 2009–
2011 RSP. Only FAA data from the following airports were examined: ATL, ORD,
LAX, DFW, and DEN. I conducted descriptive statistics to describe the sample
demographics and the research variables used in the analysis. Frequencies and
percentages were calculated for nominal data, and means and standard deviations were
calculated for continuous data (Howell, 2013).
I screened the runway incursion data for accuracy, missing data, and outliers. The
presence of outliers was tested by examination of standardized values. Standardized
values represent the number of standard deviations the value is from the mean. Values
higher than 3.29 are considered to be outliers and should be removed from the dataset
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Runway incursions with missing data were examined for
nonrandom patterns. The study did not include data entries in which a lack of complete
major sections existed.
Research Question 1
Is there a relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur on the
runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP?
Ho1: There is a no relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur
on the runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
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Ha1: There is a relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur on
the runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
To examine Research Question 1, I conducted a 2x5 chi-square analysis to assess
if differences existed between the types of runway incursions that occurred before and
after the RSP was implemented. A chi-square analysis is the appropriate analysis to
conduct when the goal is to assess the relationship between two nominal variables
(Pallant, 2010). In this case, time (pre vs. post) was the nominal independent variable of
the analysis. The dependent variable was the type of runway incursion, with levels of
operational deviation, operational error, pilot deviation, and vehicle or pedestrian
deviation.
Research Question 2
Is there a relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that occurred
before and after the 2009–2011 RSP?
Ho2: There is no relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
Ha2: There is a relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
To examine Research Question 2, I conducted a Mann-Whitney U test to assess if
differences existed between the severity of incidents that occurred before and after the
FAA implemented the 2009–2011 RSP. A Mann-Whitney U test is the appropriate
analysis to be conducted when the goal is to assess if differences exist in an ordinal
dependent variable by a dichotomous independent variable (Pallant, 2010). In this case,
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time (pre vs. post) was the nominal independent variable of the analysis. The dependent
variable was the severity of the runway incursion, with levels of Cat. A, Cat. B, Cat. C,
and Cat. D; Cat. A as the most severe and Cat. D was the least severe.
Research Question 3
Is there a relationship between the phase of flight when the runway incursion
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP?
Ho3: There is no relationship between the phase of flight when the runway
incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
Ha3: There is a relationship between the phase of flight when the runway
incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
To examine Research Question 3, I conducted a 2x3 chi-square analysis to assess
if differences existed between the phases of flight for the runway incursion that occurred
before and after the FAA implemented the 2009–2011 RSP. A chi-square analysis is the
appropriate analysis to conduct when the goal is to assess the relationship between two
nominal variables (Pallant, 2010). In this case, time (pre vs. post) was the nominal
independent variable of the analysis. The dependent variable was phase of flight for the
runway incursion, with levels of taxiing (TX), take-off (T/O) and landing (LNDG).
Sample Sizes
I conducted a sample size power analysis in G*Power. Examination of the results
of the 2x5 chi-square, Mann-Whitney U test, and the 2x3 chi-square followed. Using a
medium effect size of .30, an alpha level of .05, and a power of .80, the researcher
gathered at least 122 runway incursions to have an appropriate sample size to find
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significance for a chi-square with four degrees of freedom. The Mann-Whitney U test
required 184 runway incursions to find significance. The 2x3 chi-square only required 88
runway incursions. Therefore, I aimed to include 92 runway incursions in each group,
before and after the 2009–2011 RSP was implemented. This ensured that significance
was achieved for all three tests (Faul, Erdfelder, Buckner, & Lang, 2013).
Instrumentation and Materials
The runway incursion data utilized in this study came directly from the FAA. I
analyzed the data through an appropriate quantitative analysis utilizing SPSS 22. The
study did not include any other specific instrumentation or materials.
Validity and Reliability
Validity and reliability are important concepts when conducting effective
research. In this study, the researcher used FAA archival runway incursion data to
compare the types, severity, and phases of flight of runway incursions before and after
the implementation of the 2009–2011 RSP at the nation’s five busiest airports. According
to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), validity concerns the question of whether
the researcher is measuring what he or she intended to measure (p. 149). The data
analyzed in this study came directly from archival data collected directly by the FAA
during the course of their operations (FPMP, 2013). I did not create or utilize instruments
to measure or collect data, but instead relied on the observational data from a federal
government agency. As such, issues of validity in this study were not significant.
The FAA has addressed the issue of reliability of its runway incursion data.
Reliability concerns whether the researcher included variable errors within the measuring
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instrument (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). As part of the RSP, the FAA
utilizes performance data and information collected through a defined, repeatable risk
analysis for program management, personnel evaluation, and accountability in
prioritizing the FAA facility audits and assessments (FPMP, 2013, p. 2). The FAA
verifies and validates the accuracy of its runway incursion data through the initial
validation process followed by quality assurance and quality control reviews. The FAA
conducts reconciliation of the runway incursion database monthly and explores and
resolves any anomalies (FPMP, 2013). If inconsistencies or other problems are identified,
the FAA issues a request to re-submit the particular data (FPMP, 2013). Additionally, the
FAA conducts annual reviews of reported runway incursion data, which is then compared
with data reported from previous years. In this study, the data used in this analysis came
directly from the FAA and was not assumed to suffer from measurement error, other than
the potential for missing data or unreported cases. As such, the data used in this study
was presumably reliable.
Dissemination of Findings
I plan on sharing the findings of this study with the FAA, foreign governments,
and other aviation stakeholders who share the goal of effectively reducing runway
incursions. In developing the RSP, the FAA considered the interests of many
stakeholders (FAA, 2008). Stakeholders have a direct interest in the success of the FAA
RSP, which reduces runway incursions and thereby increases the overall safety of the
NAS. These stakeholders also have an interest in the outcome of this study, as the results
serve to affect future runway safety programs.
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I also plan on sharing the findings from this study with other federal government
agencies, such as the Department of Transportation, OIG, GAO, NTSB, with an interest
in improving aviation safety. The findings will be shared with private organizations that
have an interest in the reduction of runway incursions. These organizations include
aviation stakeholders, such as Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, the Experimental
Aircraft Association, Air Lines Pilots Association, and National Business Aviation
Association.
The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association and the Experimental Aircraft
Association strongly advocate on behalf of general aviation and the pilots who operate
primarily general aviation aircraft and work cooperatively with the FAA to ensure the
highest levels of safety in all air traffic operations. These organizational stakeholders
specifically wish to protect the interests of their pilot members and ensure that the RSP
does not impose too many restrictions, which could have a chilling effect on general
aviation within the United States. The results of this study may encourage stakeholders to
invest in future studies that may help in further reducing runway incursions, not only at
the five busiest U.S. airports, but also at smaller general aviation airports located
throughout the nation.
The results of this study will also be shared with the major airlines operating at
the five busiest airports as well as the airports themselves. The major airlines are
interested in ensuring that their share of the costs necessary to support and comply with
the provisions of the RSP are not excessive, which would create an additional financial
burden during economically challenging times. All of these stakeholders have the ability
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to modify their policies, practices, and procedures in a manner that will more effectively
reduce the potential for runway incursions. Therefore, it is reasonable that these
stakeholders will also be interested in the outcome of the evaluation of the effectiveness
of the 2009–2011 RSP.
The results of this study are also appropriate for use by the airports identified in
this study as well as the local airport unions that advocate for the many employees who
perform duties on the airport properties and who could potentially cause a runway
incursion. The airports, and the cities that in part fund them, should be concerned
regarding the costs associated with reducing runway incursions. The physical
modifications or technological improvements necessary to increase aviation safety while
minimizing costs are an important consideration when working to effectively and
efficiency reduce runway incursions at particular airports.
Employees who perform on or around the airport runways also share a substantial
interest in the results of this study. These employees are constantly transferring baggage,
cargo, supplies, and other items on and around the airport grounds and in the performance
of their duties, must at times cross active runways. Finding ways to reduce runway
incursions for this group would have a positive outcome, thus increasing their safety and
the safety of the flying public. These employees should also be concerned that because of
mandatory requirements of the FAA RSP, their activities and procedures on the airport
grounds could be substantially curtailed. Because this group of stakeholders is
predominantly interested in accomplishing their assigned duties with the least amount of
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unnecessary interference, they too should be interested in learning about the results of
this study.
Finally, another collective stakeholder with an interest in the success of the FAA
RSP is the flying public. Though a nebulous group, the entire FAA safety program is
designed to ultimately protect the flying public (FAA, 2010). An overly burdensome
program that increases travel times or adds additional governmental fees per trip could
have a significant, negative effect on air travel and its costs in the United States.
Therefore, this collective stakeholders’ input should also be considered when evaluating
the potential uses of this particular study. The flying public has a direct interest on the
effectiveness of the FAA’s runway safety program.
Each of these stakeholders is involved to some degree in the FAA RSP and will
be influenced by its success or failure; as such, their input should be given serious
consideration when evaluating the results of this study within the context of future
program modifications. Each stakeholder shares a direct interest in the results of the study
because the outcome could help determine whether the FAA RSP remains in its current
form or is modified to achieve a better effect. These stakeholders have worked side-byside with the FAA in a collaborative effort to promote the goal of aviation safety and in
particular the reduction in the number of runway incursions occurring at airports in the
United States and around the world.
Chapter Summary
In Chapter 3, I explained the methodology for this quantitative research study.
The methodology involved a summative impact-based evaluation using a comparison
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group interrupted time-series design of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP to determine the
effectiveness of the RSP at the five busiest U.S. airports. This chapter included a
discussion of the selected research design and approach used to answer the research
questions. I also addressed the source of the data used in the analysis, its acquisition
method, and the setting and sample sized utilized in this study. Finally, the chapter
included a presentation of the statistical methods and procedures implemented as part of
the study as well as the dissemination of findings. In Chapter 4, I address the findings and
their implications regarding runway incursions, aviation safety, and the FAA RSP.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to describe and analyze the type, severity, and
phase of flight of runway incursions at the five busiest U.S. airports before and after the
2009-2011 RSP, with the goal of providing information to reduce such occurrences and
thereby increase aviation safety within the NAS. In this chapter, I address the following
research questions and hypotheses:
RQ1: Is there a relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur on
the runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP?
H01: There is a no relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur
on the runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
Ha1: There is a relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur on
the runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
RQ2: Is there a relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP?
H02: There is no relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
Ha2: There is a relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
RQ3: Is there a relationship between the phase of flight when the runway
incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP?
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H03: There is no relationship between the phase of flight when the runway
incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
Ha3: There is a relationship between the phase of flight when the runway
incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.
This chapter begins with a description of the data collection process, the
preanalysis data cleaning, as well as descriptive statistics followed by a summary of the
results. Following this is a detailed analysis of the results and a brief chapter summary.
Data Collection
I collected the FAA data from runway incursions occurring from October 1, 2005
through September 30, 2014. The dataset did not include runway incursion data generated
during the pendency of the 2009–2011 RSP (10/01/2008 through 09/30/2011). Thus, the
data collection only involved data from 3 years before (10/01/2005 through 09/30/2008)
and 3 years after (10/01/2011 through 09/30/2014) the 2009–2011 RSP. I only analyzed
FAA data from five airports: ATL, ORD, LAX, DFW, and DEN. This data collection
process did not vary from the process stated in Chapter 3.
Preanalysis Data Cleaning
The original dataset consisted of 8,196 cases. I assessed these for inclusion
criteria: occurring 3 years before or after the 2009–2011 RSP and occurring at the ATL,
ORD, LAX, DFW, or DEN airports. I removed a total of 1,133 cases for not meeting the
date requirement and removed a total of 6,639 cases for not meeting the location
requirement. The analysis then involved an assessment of outliers using the guidelines
put forth by Tabachnick and Fidell (2013). I created standardized scores and removed any
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cases falling outside of ±3.29 standard deviations, considered outliers. A total of 13 cases
were removed as outliers, which consequently removed the entire potential Cat. A
incursions from the data. This left a final dataset of 411 cases for analyses.
Table 2
Frequencies and Percentages of Type, Severity, and Phase of Incursion
Variable

n

%

OD

0

0.0

OE

61

14.8

OTH

67

16.3

PD

200

48.7

V/PD

83

20.2

Cat A

0

0.0

Cat B

7

1.7

Cat C

176

42.8

Cat D

137

33.3

N/A

91

22.1

Taxi

259

63.0

Takeoff

42

10.2

Landing

69

16.8

N/A

41

10.0

Type

Severity

Phase

Note. Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error.
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Descriptive Statistics
Of the final 411 cases, a large proportion were classified as PD (n = 200,
48.70%). Lesser amounts were classified as OE (n = 61, 14.8%), OTH (n = 67, 16.3%),
or V/PD (n = 83, 20.2%). Most occurred during the taxiing phase (n = 259, 63.00%),
although 10.2% occurred during takeoff, 16.8% occurred during landing, and 10.0% did
not apply to the allotted categories. The most frequently reported severity level was Cat.
C (n = 176, 42.80%), with none in Cat. A, 1.7% in Cat. B, and 33.3% in Cat. D. Aside
from these categories, 22.1% did not fall into the allotted categories. Table 2 presents all
frequencies and deviations.
Summary of Findings
I assessed results of the analyses of Research Questions 1, 2, and 3 in terms of the
chi-square and Mann-Whitney U tests used to answer these questions. The chi-square
analysis used to answer Research Question 1 indicated a statistically significant
relationship between the type of incursion and time of occurrence, where more total
incursions were reported postprogram. However, fewer OE type incursions occurred
postprogram and slightly fewer V/PD type incursions occurred postprogram. The MannWhitney U analysis used to test Research Question 2 identified a statistically significant
difference in severity of runway incursions based on whether incursions were taken from
a group before or after the 2009–2011 RSP, with higher severity before the 2009-2011
RSP. The final chi-square analysis conducted on Research Question 3 indicated that there
was no statistically significant relationship between the phase of flight of the runway
incursions and time of the program.
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External Validity
To assess external validity of the sample, I compared demographics of the sample
to those of the population. For the type of runway incursion, PD represented the highest
number of incursions (63.4%). V/PD (24.2%) was the second highest type of incursion,
followed by OE (5.2%) and OTH (7.2%). The severity of the incursions from the sample
was slightly different from the population with Cat. D (62.4%) having more than Cat. C
(36.7%), but Cat. B (0.9%) still shows the least amount of incursions. Finally, the phase
of flight of the runway incursions was also similar to those from the population.
Specifically, TX (63.5%) had the highest percentage, followed by LNDG (20.9%) and
T/O (15.6%). Overall, the sample was representative of the population.
Results
Research Question 1
I conducted a 2x5 chi-square test of independence to examine whether runway
incursion type and time of program were independent. Two levels in time existed:
preprogram and postprogram. Five levels in type of runway incursion existed: V/PD, PD,
OTH, OE, and OD. Prior to conducting the analysis, I assessed the assumption of
adequate cell size, which requires all cells to have expected values higher than 0 and 80%
of cells to have expected values of at least five (Howell, 2013). All cells had expected
values higher than 0, indicating the first condition was met. A total of 100% of the cells
had expected frequencies of at least five, indicating the second condition was met.
The overall results of the chi-square test were significant, χ2(4) = 104.07, p <
.001, indicating that a significant relationship existed between the type of runway
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incursions preprogram verses postprogram (time). As such, the null hypothesis for
Research Question 1 was rejected. Overall, more total incursions were reported
postprogram (n = 232, 56.40%) than preprogram (n = 179, 43.60%). However, fewer OE
type incursions occurred postprogram (n = 8, 1.90%) when compared to preprogram (n =
53, 12.90%), and slightly fewer V/PD type incursions occurred postprogram (n = 46,
11.20%) versus preprogram (n = 37, 9.00%). Therefore, significantly fewer OE and V/PD
incursions occurred, but significantly more PD (n = 120, 29.20%) and OTH (n = 67,
16.3%) incursions occurred after the program. Table 3 presents the results of this
analysis.
Table 3
Results of the Chi-Square Analysis Comparing Type of Incursion by Time of Occurrence
Time
Pre-program

Post-program

Type

n

% of total

n

% of total

OE

53

12.9

8

1.9

OTH

0

0.0

67

16.3

PD

80

19.5

120

29.2

V/PD

46

11.2

37

9.0

OD

0

0.0

0

0.0

179

43.6

232

56.4

Total
Note. χ2(4) = 104.07, p < .001.
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Research Question 2
I conducted a Mann-Whitney U two-sample rank-sum test to examine whether
significant differences existed in the severity of runway incursions before and after the
2009–2011 RSP. The Mann-Whitney U two-sample rank-sum test is a nonparametric
alternative to the independent samples t-test and does not share the independent samples
t-test’s distributional assumptions (Lehmann, 2006). In all, I gathered 128 observations in
Group 1 (preprogram), 192 observations in Group 2 (postprogram), and 91 classified as
NA. The results of the Mann-Whitney U Test were significant, U = 15091.5, z = -3.98, p
< .001. The mean rank for Group 1 was 182.40, and the mean rank for Group 2 was
145.90. The distribution of the severity of runway incursions for Group 1 was
significantly different from the distribution of the severity of runway incursions for
Group 2. The severity of the runway incursions was significantly lower postprogram than
it was preprogram. Table 4 presents the results of the Mann-Whitney U Test.
Table 4
Mann-Whitney U Test for Severity of Runway Incursion by Time of Occurrence
1

2

Variable

Mean Rank

Mean Rank

U

z

p

Severity

182.40

145.90

15091.5

-3.98

< .001

Research Question 3
I conducted a 2x3 chi-square test of independence to examine the relationship of
phase of flight of the runway incursions and time of the program. The two levels in time
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were preprogram and postprogram. The three levels in phase of flight of the runway
incursions were taxiing (TX), take-off (T/O), and landing (LNDG). Prior to conducting
the analysis, I assessed the assumption of adequate cell size, which requires all cells to
have expected values higher than 0 and 80% of cells to have expected values of at least
five (Howell, 2013). All cells had expected values higher than 0, indicating the first
condition was met. A total of 100% of the cells had expected frequencies of at least five,
indicating the second condition was also met.
The results of the chi-square test were not significant, χ2(2) = 4.67, p = .097,
suggesting that independence could not be ruled out as an explanatory mechanism for the
relationship between phase of flight of the runway incursions and time (preprogram
verses postprogram) of the RSP. The observed frequencies were not significantly
different from the expected frequencies. As such, the null hypothesis for Research
Question 3 could not be rejected. Table 5 presents the results of the chi-square test for
Research Question 3.
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Table 5
Results of the Chi-Square Analysis Comparing Phase of Flight and Time of Occurrence
Time
Pre-program
Flight Phase

Post-program

n

% of total

n

% of total

Taxiing

108

29.2

151

40.8

Takeoff

25

6.8

17

4.6

Landing

31

8.4

38

10.3

Total

164

44.3

206

55.7

Note. χ2(2) = 4.67, p = .097.

Chapter Summary
This chapter included descriptive statistics along with a summary and a detailed
analysis of the results for each of the research questions in this study. To assess Research
Question 1, I performed a chi-square analysis and found it to be significant. The results of
this analysis suggested a significant relationship between the types of runway incursions
occurring preprogram and postprogram. I further established that significantly more
runway incursions occurred postprogram compared to preprogram. To assess Research
Question 2, I performed a Mann-Whitney U test, and I found that a significant difference
existed between preprogram and postprogram severity of runway incursions. To assess
Research Question 3, I performed a second chi-square analysis and found it to be not
significant. No statistically significant association existed between the phases of flight of
the runway incursions preprogram verses postprogram.
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The next chapter includes a discussion of these findings and their interpretations
in the context of this study and existing literature. I address implications for social
change, recommendations for action, and recommendations for future research studies in
the area of runway incursions and aviation safety.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
Through this study, I focused on determining the effectiveness of the FAA 2009–
2011 RSP at the nation’s five busiest airports. Runway incursions have been an
increasing threat because of projected increases in air traffic within the United States and
throughout the world (FAA, 2015). The FAA designed the RSP for the purpose of
reducing runway incursions and increasing aviation safety throughout the NAS (FAA,
2002, 2008). Whether the FAA RSP has been effectively reducing runway incursion was
a question that needed to be answered. I answered this question by comparing the types,
severity, and phase of flight of runway incursions from 3 years before and after the RSP
at the nation’s five busiest airports. Through this quantitative study, I sought to draw a
correlation between runway incursions’ type, severity, and phase of flight at these five
airports preprogram versus postprogram, thus providing a more focused picture of the
effect of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP.
I explored the following research questions: (a) is there a relationship between the
types of runway incursions that occur on the runway before and after the 2009–2011
RSP? (b) is there a relationship between the severity of runway incursions before and
after the 2009–2011 RSP? and (c) is there a relationship between the phase of flight when
the runway incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP? Several key findings
emerged from this study. The first finding was that a significant relationship existed
between the types of runway incursions that occur on the runway before and after the
2009–2011 RSP. The second finding was that significant differences existed between the
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severity of runway incursions that occurred before verses after the 2009–2011 RSP.
Lastly, no statistically significant relationship existed between the phases of flight when
the runway incursions occurred before and after the RSP.
This study filled a gap in the literature associated with runway incursions because
I analyzed runway incursions from more than just a numerical perspective. Instead, I
considered runway incursions regarding the type, severity, and when, during the phase of
flight, the runway incursion occurred. Because of this study, an improved understanding
exists regarding the relationships between these variables. Additionally, I established a
more detailed picture of the effect of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP, which can assist decision
makers in modifying the RSP to enhance its overall effectiveness.
Consistent with the underlying theoretical base, the use of a comparative group
(Holland, 1986; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983), interrupted time-series design (Henry,
2010) helped to analyze the runway incursion data in a manner that allowed me to answer
the research questions. I highlight the causal results (impact) that the FAA 2009–2011
RSP had on reducing runway incursions and increasing aviation safety within the NAS.
In previous runway incursion and aviation safety literature, researchers
predominately studied runway incursions by categorizing these instances into their
component parts and then analyzing these parts to better understand their relationship to
one another as well as seeking methods to reduce their number and severity.
Governmental organizations, aviation stakeholders, and academics have attempted to
discuss runway incursions in terms of their inherent risk to the NAS. These researchers
explored communication problems (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2004) and
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focused on human factors (Chang & Wong, 2012; Rantanen et al., 2006) as well as
organizational structures issues (Adam et al., 2002; ICAO, 2002; Rogerson & Lambert,
2012) to develop recommendations useful for reducing runway incursions. Other
researchers have studied the best technological advancements that can be introduced at
airports and used by pilots to enhance safety (Horowitz & Santos, 2009; Schonefeld &
Moller, 2012), such as RIPAS and RIAAS (NASA, 2005), which would assist in
decreasing the number of runway incursions and their precursor events (Schonefeld &
Moller, 2012). The FAA (2009) has also emphasized the importance of timely
implementation of runway safety-enhancing technologies (ASDE-X, FAROS, and
RWSL), at the nation’s five busiest airports as well as a number of other airports
throughout the country.
The findings resulting from this research study supplement the existing literature
and provide increased insights into which methods implemented by the FAA have had
the most significant effect at reducing runway incursions. The results of this study will
help FAA decision makers and other stakeholders establish a deeper understanding of the
effectiveness of technological and other methods for reducing runway incursions. This
knowledge will assist those charged with improving aviation safety throughout the world
to improve their aviation safety programs. Ensuring that aviation is globally safer for all
the flying public and the many others in the aviation industry will increase aviation
operations worldwide and thereby encourage positive social change. As public
administrators work to create and improve policies designed to enhance aviation safety
for the public (Lowi et al., 2015), the results of this research study allow these
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administrators to focus their attention on those methods that will most likely have the
most significant effect on improving aviation safety in the NAS and throughout the
world.
Interpretation of Findings
This research study’s findings and resulting interpretations are important when
considering how to improve the FAA RSP in future years. All aviation safety
stakeholders must work collaboratively to reduce runway incursions throughout the
world. Though this study only pertained to runway incursions at the five busiest U.S.
airports, the results are applicable to airports throughout the world and provide a deeper
understanding of which methods most effectively reduce runway incursions. Through
collaborative efforts, aviation safety stakeholders can work to develop methods,
techniques, and procedures that will have the most significant influence on reducing the
frequency and severity of runway incursions.
Before discussing each of the research questions in this study, understanding the
descriptive statistics relating to the final dataset of 411 cases used in the analysis was
important. The total number of runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports
increased from 179 (preprogram) to 232 (postprogram). If a positive effect had resulted
from the implementation of technological advances and improvements designed to reduce
runway incursions at the nations’ five busiest airports, a reduction in the total number of
runway incursions would have been expected. The fact that more runway incursions are
happening after the RSP is of concern and requires a deeper inquiry into the underlying
nature and circumstances of these incursions.
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Research Question 1
Research Question 1 addressed the relationship between the types of runway
incursions occurring before and after the FAA 2009–2011 RSP. I analyzed five types of
runway incursion: V/PD, PD, OE, OD, and OTH. If the RSP had been effective at
reducing runway incursions, a difference in the types of runway incursions would be
expected. Additionally, analyzing the numbers of different types of runway incursions
before and after the RSP provides insights into any influence the RSP had on reducing
these types of runway incursions preprogram verses postprogram.
The chi-square analysis used to answer Research Question 1 determined that a
significant relationship existed between the types of runway incursions occurring before
and after the RSP. The overall results of the chi-square test were significant, χ2(4) =
104.07, p < .001, indicating that a relationship existed between the types of runway
incursions preprogram verses postprogram existed. Although the overall number of
runway incursions increased preprogram to postprogram, fewer OE type incursions
occurred postprogram (n = 8, 1.9%) when compared to preprogram (n = 53, 12.9%).
Table 3 from Chapter 4 presents the full breakdown of Research Question 1 results from
the chi-square analysis comparing the type of incursion and time of its occurrence. The
fact that a reduction in OE (air traffic controller errors) occurred, while a corresponding
increase in the total number of runway incursions postprogram was significant, suggests
that the methods implemented by the RSP to reduce this type of runway incursion are
having a positive effect on reducing runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest
airports.
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Runway incursions are fairly frequent as a topic within the larger body of
knowledge regarding flight safety literature (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2004;
Horowitz & Santos, 2009; ICAO, 2002). Researchers have concluded that major airports
in the United States operate with unacceptable levels of risk because of their inherent
potential for runway incursions and their failure to adequately address these safety
concerns (ALPA, 2007; NTSB, 2010). This is partly why the FAA adopted the RSP as a
means of diminishing instances of runway incursions (Skorupski, 2010). Because of the
significant exposure that could result from an aviation accident, safety has remained an
essential component in air transportation (Skorupski, 2010). As a part of the RSP, the
FAA amended Code of Federal Regulations §91.129(i), requiring that all aircraft runway
crossings be authorized only by ATC instructions or clearances (NTSB, 2000). The FAA
also modified FAA Order 7110.65, which changed ATC procedures that required
aircrafts crossing multiple runways to be issued ATC crossing instructions for each
runway after the aircraft crossed the previous runway (NTSB, 2000, p. 16). These
changes have had a positive influence in reducing OE at the five busiest airports in the
nation and should be continued as it appears to be having a positive influence on reducing
this type of runway incursion. Consistent with the reduction in OE type of runway
incursions, the V/PD type of incursion also decreased from 11.2% (46 events) to 9.0%
(37 events). This result was another positive indicator that the RSP has had a positive
effective on reducing this type of runway incursions. The methods used by the RSP to
help in the reduction of V/PD type of incursions should also be emphasized because it
appears to be producing the desired outcome.
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However, the number of PD and OTH type of runway incursions increased
significantly. This was supported by Schonefeld and Moller (2012), who asserted that
even with RIPAS installations, there will still be risks to runway safety at various
airports. Schonefeld and Moller (2012) reported that due to the expansion of commercial
aviation into general aviation airports, the risk of runway incursions will continue to
increase. This was seen within the current study, wherein the number of PD type of
runway incursion increased by 9.7%, from 19.5 % (80 events) preprograms to 29.2%
(120 events) postprogram. This finding is significant in that the methods used by the RSP
to reduce the number of PD type runway incursions are not effectively working. This
finding contradicts the findings of Jones and Young (2001), who posited that by being
aware of the aircraft at an airport, having an accurate understanding of the route aircraft
was directed to travel by ATC, and having the ability to effectively detect and correct
route deviation, the RSP can assist pilots in avoiding runway incursions. These methods,
which include educating, training, and establishing new procedures, do not appear to be
reducing these type of runway incursions at the nation’s five business airports. As a
larger number of less qualified pilots access these airports with the projected increase in
aviation operations (FAA, 2015), the threat posed by PD type of runway incursions will
likely increase significantly.
Also of concern is the fact that the OTH type of runway incursions has increased
by 16.3%. A deeper understanding and analysis of these OTH types of runway incursions
would be helpful in assisting the FAA with improving its RSP. Future researchers should
consider exploring this phenomenon and provide information to the FAA and other
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aviation safety stakeholders. The FAA will need to determine what can be changed
within the RSP to increase the effect of the RSP and reduce these types of runway
incursions. Previous to the establishment of the RSP, it was determined that runway
incursions were most often caused by unreliability within the Automatic Dependency
Surveillance-Broadcast and Traffic Information Broadcast traffic data (Cassell, 2005;
Green, 2002; Jones & Young, 2001); however, the development of RSP was believed to
be the correction to these problems (Jones & Prinzel, 2011). Rather, it has been
established that even with the implementation of RSP, there are still outlying problems
with runway incursions.
According to the results emerging from the analysis of Research Question 1, there
was a significant relationship between the types of runway incursions occurring
preprogram and postprogram. The RSP has not changed the types of runway incursions
occurring at the nation’s five busiest airports. If the RSP had a positive effect on these
types of runway incursions, significant differences between preprogram and postprogram
RSP samples would be expected. The fact that this change did not occur is concerning
and suggests that the FAA needs to improve its RSP.
Research Question 2
Research Question 2 addressed the relationship between the severities of the
runway incursions occurring before and after the FAA 2009–2011 RSP. The results of
this test showed that no statistically significantly relationship existed between the severity
of the nature of runway incursions that occurred before the implementation of the RSP
and those that occurred after the RSP.
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Group 1 had 128 observations (preprogram), and Group 2 had 192 observations
(postprogram). In addition, 91 observations were classified as NA. The results of the
Mann-Whitney U test were significant, U = 15091.5, z = -3.98, p < .001. The mean rank
for Group 1 was 182.40, and the mean rank for Group 2 was 145.90. The distribution of
the severity of runway incursions for Group 1 was significantly different from the
distribution of the severity of runway incursions for Group 2. The severity of the runway
incursions was significantly lower postprogram than it was preprogram. The RSP has
been effective in reducing the most severe of runway incursions at the nation’s five
busiest airports. See Table 4 in Chapter 4 for the results of the Mann-Whitney U test for
the severity of runway incursions by time of occurrence.
The fact that the severity of the runway incursions for Group 1 was significantly
different than the distribution for Group 2 is positive. One of the goals of the FAA RSP
was to reduce the severity of the runway incursions from the more severe, Cat. A, to the
less severe, Cat. D (FAA, 2008). The RSP has been successful in reducing the severity of
runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. All 13 of the Cat. A incursions
were removed as outliers from the dataset, because they fell outside ±3.29 standard
deviations (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). The FAA 2009–2011 RSP has been effective at
reducing the severity of runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. This is
similar to the assertions of Schonefeld and Moller (2012) who purported that if RIPAS
was to theoretically succeed, there would be a decrease in the number of runway
incursions and the events leading to a potential runway incursion; but, a corresponding
decrease in the severity of the runway incursion should also occur.
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Managing risk and safety effectively is a practical problem, which has historically
been addressed by examining the underlying causes of incidents and accidents,
identifying the risks associated with them, and then determining appropriate safety
standards consistent with socially acceptable values (Skorupski, 2010). Although I found
that there was not a decrease in the number of runway incursions, there was a decrease in
the severity of the reported runway incursions. This is because aircraft traffic relies on
human decision-making, which can be disastrous if adequate information is not conveyed
in time to the pilots (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012). With the quality of information
enhanced through technology, poor decisions can be minimized, thereby reducing the
severity of runway incursions (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012).
Research Question 3
Research Question 3 addressed the relationship between the phase of flight of
runway incursions occurring before and after the FAA 2009–2011 RSP. I analyzed TX,
T/O, and LNDG preprogram verses postprogram in this chi-square analysis. The results
of this test were not significant, χ2(2) = 4.67, p = .097, suggesting that independence
cannot be ruled out as an explanation for the relationship between phase of flight of the
runway incursions and time (preprogram v. postprogram) of the RSP. The observed
frequencies were not significantly different from the expected frequencies. See Table 5 in
Chapter 4, which identifies the results of the chi-square analysis comparing phase of
flight and time of the occurrence.
The taxiing phase of flight for postprogram runway incursions increased from the
preprogram occurrences by 12.6%. Before the RSP, 108 (29.2%) runway incursions

111
occurred during the taxiing phase of flight and 151 (40.8%) occurred after the RSP. The
fact that a higher percentage of the runway incursions happened during the taxiing phase
of the flight is a positive indicator that the RSP had a beneficial influence on reducing
runway incursions. When runway incursions occur during the taxiing phase of a flight
operation, an increased likelihood exists that any resulting injuries will be less severe and
any resulting damage will be less substantial because lower speeds exist at the time of the
impact. The number of runway incursions happening during the landing phase increased
from 31 (8.4%) preprogram to 38 (10.3%) postprogram. Although the increase in total
number of runway incursions occurring during the taxiing phase was a positive indicator
and suggested an improvement in aviation safety, an increase in the number of incursions
happening during the landing phase suggested a higher threat to aviation safety and
increased risk to the flying public.
On a positive note, a decrease occurred in the number of runway incursions
happening during the takeoff phase of the flight. The results showed 25 (6.8%)
preprogram runway incursions during the takeoff phase, compare to 17 (4.6%)
postprogram. Because the takeoff phase of flight includes aircrafts operating at high rates
of speed, a reduction of runway incursions during this critical phase of flight is
significant. This result also suggests that the RSP has positively reduced runway
incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. It should be noted that the results of
Research Question 3 did not have any relation to the previous findings reported within
Chapter 2. An additional search of the preexisting literature also indicated that phase of
flight and runway incursions occurring before and after the FAA 2009–2011 RSP,
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including taxiing and landing, were not accounted for by previous researchers, indicating
a need for further study in regards to runway incursions and phase of flight. This is
necessary research that must be undertaken given the enormous risk that accompanies
runway incursions during takeoff and landing, wherein pilots are often responsible not
only for highly complex pieces of machinery, but also human lives.
In conclusion, the collective results from the three research questions established
that the FAA 2009–2011 RSP had some influence in effectively reducing runway
incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports, but modifications need to occur to help
improve the program’s overall reduction of runway incursions. The results from Research
Question 1 raise concerns in light of the fact that the analysis determined a significant
relationship existed between the types of runway incursions occurring before and after
the RSP. Though OE and V/PD types of incursions decreased, a significant increase
existed in the number of PD types of runway incursions postprogram. A substantial
increase in the number of pilot deviations resulting in runway incursions is serious and
does not suggest that the RSP has effectively reduced runway incursions at the nation’s
five busiest airports. Even though the findings establish a positive influence on reducing
the severity of runway incursions, as well as a positive movement in the phase of flight
from more hazardous to less hazardous, the significant correlation between the
preprogram and postprogram types of runway incursions is of significant concern. These
findings suggest that the FAA needs to modify the RSP to focus more of its attention on
reducing the number of pilot deviations.
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The primary research question presented in this research study was whether the
FAA 2009–2011 RSP has effectively reduced runway incursions at the nation’s five
busiest airports. Based on the research findings and their relevant interpretations, the
ultimate finding is that the FAA 2009–2011 RSP has not effectively reduced runway
incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. The FAA needs to re-evaluate its RSP and
explore additional ways to increase its overall influence, especially as it relates to
reducing the number of runway incursions resulting from pilot deviations.
Implications for Social Change
The results of this research study have significant implications for positive social
change locally, nationally and internationally. Though the FAA 2009–2011 has made
some progress in effectively reducing runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest
airports, the RSP has not effectively reduced runway incursions since the same types of
runway incursions are occurring preprogram as compared to postprogram. Improving the
RSP to address the increasing threat of pilot deviations resulting in runway incursions
and negatively affecting aviation safety is a significant concern that needs to be
appropriately addressed to ensure the highest levels of aviation safety within the NAS.
The findings from this study will have important influences on constructive modifications
of the RSP, thereby substantially increasing aviation safety for all members of society
and encouraging positive social change throughout the world.
On a local level, fewer runway incursions translate into less aircraft accidents on
the many airports throughout the nation. A reduced number of aircraft accidents mean a
safer working environment for airport employees and the many others who rely upon it
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for a living. Though the nature of aviation has historically presented significant safety
risks (FAA Flight Standards Service, 2012) and continues to be one of the most
substantial risks that jeopardize aviation safety within the NAS (FAA, 2014d), reducing
runway incursions and thereby decreasing the inherent safety risks associated with
aviation directly benefits society.
A safer aviation environment will promote industrial growth throughout the world
during the next several decades (FAA, 2015). As growth in aviation operations occur, the
potential risk of a runway incursion also increases (FAA, 2013a). As larger numbers of
people travel, both nationally and internationally, keeping these individuals safe is of
primary importance for all governments (Lowi et al., 2015) as well as aviation
stakeholders. With enhanced aviation safety, the overall costs of traveling decrease,
which allows more people to travel by air and thereby stimulates the world’s economies
by providing new opportunities for those employed or otherwise connected with the
aviation industry (Air Transportation Action Group, 2014). Reducing the potential for
runway incursions and enhancing aviation safety will help improve the inherent safety of
air traffic operations throughout the world (FAA, 2014d).
Higher levels of safety will positively stimulate the growth of aviation activities,
resulting in further economic expansion, thereby benefiting many individuals and
developing countries worldwide. Improving the quality of life for members of a society
through means of social, political, and economic modification supports positive social
change. Developing a vibrant air traffic system within a country can have a positive
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influence strengthening the infrastructure of a nation as well as helping maintain a more
resilient economy (Air Transportation Action Group, 2016).
The FAA will use the findings from this study to successfully modify their RSP
so that the program’s resources can be more efficiently allocated for the purpose of
effectively reducing runway incursions not only at the five busiest U.S. airports, but also
throughout the world. Improving aviation safety through the reduction of runway
incursions and thereby increasing the inherent safety of aviation worldwide will result in
positive social change for everyone.
Recommendations for Action
Since the inception of the RSP in 2002, the FAA has focused its attention on
reducing the number and severity of runway incursion within the United States (FAA,
2008). Historically, air traffic accidents are generally a combination of different
interrelated factors (Skorupski, 2010). How best to address this combination of factors
that lead to runway incursions is a question that the FAA has struggled with when
creating and subsequently modifying their RSP.
The findings from this research study established that the RSP has made some
limited progress in achieving its safety goals and objectives, but needs to do more to
effectively reduce runway incursions at the five busiest airports in the nation. This section
addresses several recommendations for action within the context of this study, which
could prove beneficial in the attainment of the FAA’s specified goals and objective for
the RSP. While I viewed the FAA RSP in a theoretical context, it was determined that,
theoretically, RSP is not as successful as it potentially could be, but is a step in the right
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direction. This was determined within Research Question 3, wherein I determined that the
FAA RSP has not worked effectively to reduce runway incursions during the landing
phase. Instead, it was reported that runway incursions during the landing phase of flight
actually increased 31 to 38, demonstrating a 1.9% increase. This is especially troubling
given the fact that an increase in the number of incursions happening during the landing
phase suggests a greater threat to aviation safety and increased risk to the flying public.
The FAA needs to reevaluate the way in which the RSP works to reduce runway
incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports and throughout the country. Several of
these recommendations to improve the RSP are consistent with previous
recommendations from organizations, such as the OIG and NTSB. In light of the
increased number of pilot deviations resulting in runway incursions, the FAA should
promote increased voluntary pilot participation in the Runway Incursion Information
Evaluation Program (OIG, 2010). To date, the FAA has not taken an active lead in
promoting the Runway Incursion Information Evaluation Program to pilots in order to
collect and analyze more data to identify and mitigate runway incursion causal factors
(OIG, 2010). If pilots are not encouraged to participate in these types of programs, the
data necessary to establish a stronger connection with causal factors influencing is
missing in the effort to reduce runway incursions.
The FAA needs to focus on the three factors that enhance a pilot’s ability to
timely detect a potential runway incursion, which are an awareness of other traffic in the
airport environment, a continuing awareness of the aircraft’s location in the airport
environment, and the activity status of the operating runway (Jones & Young, 2001;
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Schonefeld & Moller, 2012). Providing additional training and education to pilots is
important if the FAA is going to effectively reduce runway incursions resulting from
pilot deviations.
Also important is increased collaboration with the airline communities to establish
a process whereby regional RSP managers would receive access to internal data on
runway incursions and surface incidents, which will aid in identifying trends, underlying
reasons, and possible local solutions to runway incursions. These solutions can be shared
with other aviation safety stakeholders. Sharing local best practices successful in
reducing runway incursions elsewhere throughout the NAS would be helpful in
promoting enhanced aviation safety.
The FAA may also wish to implement increased training requirements for pilots
desiring to conduct flight operations at a particular airport. During this enhanced training
and consistent with an earlier OIG recommendation (OIG, 2010), the FAA should require
a safety risk analysis to evaluate existing operational procedures at those airports where
the FAA has identified potential runway safety risks. Consistent with the OIG’s
recommendation (OIG, 2010), emphasis must be placed on increased collaboration
between aviation industry stakeholders and encourage shared safety risk analysis. By
promoting this approach, all the stakeholders share a common goal of working to reduce
runway incursions at the nation’s airports. Ideally, this type of collaborative relationship
will have a positive effect on reducing the number of runway incursions resulting from
pilot deviations.
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With an increase in the number of taxiing related runway incursions, the FAA
needs to take steps to minimize these risks. Previously, the GAO (2009) emphasized that
the FAA should increase aviation oversight, especially of runway and ramp areas,
through improved aviation safety data. As part of their recommendations, the GAO
(2000) suggested implementing existing and current technologies while providing
incentives for the acquisition of the latest technologies for airlines as well as enhancing
runways and more effectively using advantages of NextGen technologies.
The FAA also needs to focus attention on reducing runway incursions through the
effective deployment of technological advancements, such as RIPAS and RIAAS
(NASA, 2005). These systems will assist pilots and others in avoiding runway incursions
by providing them early warnings designed to avoid the events leading up to an
incursion. Other researchers (Horowitz & Santos, 2009; Schonefeld & Moller, 2012)
support the continued deployment of technological advancements throughout the NAS.
These technological advancements would help provide operational information, while
avoiding poor decisions that could lead to runway incursions. The FAA (2009) has
previously expressed an interest in further developing and deploying runway safetyenhancing technologies (ASDE-X, FAROS, and RWSL), but needs to do much more in
this area, especially as air traffic within the NAS increases.
When considering the best ways to reduce runway incursions throughout the
nation, the FAA needs to pay special attention to general aviation pilots to avoid runway
incursions. The findings from this research study demonstrate that pilot deviations
resulting in runway incursions are a significant aviation safety concern. Compared to
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general aviation pilots, commercial pilots undergo more frequent training and are
required to complete mandated proficiency checks prior to providing services for
commercial operators, with most major airline carriers exceeding the minimum currency
and training requirements (ALPA, 2011). In light of the findings of this research study,
setting new training requirements for pilots especially regarding runway incursions
should be a focus for the FAA as they reevaluate their RSP.
The FAA needs to continue its training programs for its air traffic controllers,
which have resulted in a decrease in the number of operational errors previously
occurring at the airports. Those methods designed to assist pilots also need to be
enhanced. The FAA needs to focus on educating and training pilots. This education must
be taken through the FAA and by all stakeholders, such as the airlines. The FAA must
also encourage aviation safety stakeholders to work collaboratively to reduce runway
incursions throughout the world. Increased cooperation with ICAO and other aviation
organizations, such as the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association and the Experimental
Aircraft Association, can produce positive outcomes.
Additionally, The FAA should use it certification powers under Part 139 of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 C.F.R. Part 139; FAA, 2016a) to require airports that
conduct passenger-carrying operations to install technologic advances in order to promote
a safer NAS. The FAA (2016a), through appropriate rulemaking, can require certain
airports to be properly certificated and mandate that they meet established and stringent
safety requirements (FAA, 2016a). When the FAA approves these requirements, the
airports only legally operate commercial aircraft operations when they are in compliance.
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Information resulting from this study will permit the FAA and its public administrators to
increase as necessary the applicable standards under Part 139, thereby ensuring enhanced
safety within the NAS. With an improved runway safety program, the number, types, and
severity of runway incursions should decrease and the overall safety of the nation’s
airports should increase, thereby making air transportation safer for the flying public. A
worldwide reduction in runway incursions is critical in light of the forecasted growth in
flight operations during the next several decades (FAA, 2015).
The FAA, foreign governments, and other aviation safety stakeholders should use
the findings developed from this research study in improving their aviation safety
programs designed to reduce runway incursions. By improving their runway safety
programs, the overall safety of the air travel system throughout the world will improve,
thus creating positive social change by enhancing human and social conditions relating to
air travel. The findings from this study will be provided to the Runway Safety Team so
they can use it to help improve the RSP and also provide critical safety information to
pilots and the many others involved in the aviation industry.
Limitations of the Study
There are several limitations associated with this study. This study focused on
whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP has effectively reduced runway incursions at the five
busiest U.S. airports. Limiting this study to the five busiest U.S. airports, decreases its
applicability to general aviation airports where runway incursions are likely to occur.
Generally, at the five busiest airports professional pilots are conducting large commercial
aircraft operations carrying passengers and cargo. The type of flight operations, the
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pilots’ proficiency levels, as well as the level of experience of air traffic controllers vary
significantly from smaller general aviation airports. As such, the reasons for runway
incursions at these smaller airports may be substantially different from those occurring at
the nation’s five busiest airports. When seeking to reduce runway incursions throughout
the U.S., understanding the factors affecting runway incursions at these general aviation
airports is critical.
An additional limitation is that this study only relied upon three dependent
variables, including type, severity and phase of flight of the runway incursion. There are
a number of other factors that could also influence runway incursions, such as pilot
experience, weather conditions, airport complexity, as well as aircraft type (Rogerson &
Lambert, 2012). Each of these factors could have an influence on whether a runway
incursion is more or less likely to occur at a particular airport. This study was narrowly
focused and its results are most applicable to larger airports conducting commercial
operations. A more robust study which analyzes a greater number of variables would be
helpful in providing a more detailed image of runway incursions throughout the entire
NAS.
Finally, this study was quantitative in nature and did not consider other qualitative
factors that could provide a more detailed picture of runway incursions throughout the
NAS. Since runway incursions occur as a result of many factors (Rogerson & Lambert,
2012), truly understanding the reasons why runway incursions result from both the pilot
and air traffic controller’s viewpoint would be very helpful to the FAA when designing a
more effective RSP. In future research studies involving runway incursions, the
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limitations inherent in this study could be overcome, thereby further enhancing the
overall effectiveness of the RSP throughout the nation.
Recommendations for Further Study
Based upon the findings from this research study, several recommendations for
further study naturally emerge. Finding ways to improve aviation safety is a goal shared
by all aviation stakeholders. Further studies can help in determining what works best
when reducing runway incursions. These researchers can explore runway incursions
beyond the five busiest airports in the nation and consider this important aviation safety
issue at all airports in the United States and potentially throughout the world.
One of the pending issues that remains unanswered and merits more study
involves reasons why highly qualified professional pilots are still involved in a significant
number of runway incursions resulting from pilot deviations. Increasing the
understanding in this area is important when seeking the best ways to help pilots avoid
runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports in the nation and worldwide.
Future researchers should conduct qualitative studies and incorporate surveys, focus
groups, and other methods designed to explore reasons why highly qualified pilots are
still having challenges with runway incursions. Findings from this study would assist in
increasing knowledge regarding why pilot deviations are a growing cause of runway
incursions at the five busiest U.S. airports. Also important for further study is a deeper
understanding of the factors that encouraged a reduction in the number of operational
errors by air traffic controllers. A qualitative study, including surveys and focus groups,
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involving air traffic controllers would be helpful in developing useful information that
answers this important question.
Additionally, expanding this research study to include a larger number of airports
across the nation would provide additional findings that incorporate not only professional
pilots in its analysis, but also less skilled general aviation pilots. This would further
broaden the focus of the findings from this research study and provide additional
guidance and information to assist the FAA, foreign governments, and aviation safety
stakeholders in more effectively reducing runway incursions and enhancing aviation
safety.
The implementation of NextGen and its resulting influence on runway incursions
and aviation safety is also a significant factor that needs to be explored. In many respects,
NextGen will make aviation operations less complex for commercial operations and more
complex for general aviation enthusiasts who must learn to operate in this new
environment (FAA, 2016b). As part of NextGen, the FAA and aviation stakeholders are
encouraged to work together as part of the NextGen Advisory Committee to “identify
high-benefit, high-readiness NextGen capabilities for implementation in the near term”
(FAA, 2016b, p. 3). This future study would be helpful to develop findings that could
assist in reducing runway incursions and improving aviation safety within the NAS.
Finally, the increasing integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS),
commonly referred to as drones, into the NAS is also a significant concern that could
have a substantial effect on aviation safety. The FAA (2016c) expects UAS within the
NAS to increase from 1.9 million in 2016 to approximately 4.3 million by 2020.
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Meanwhile, commercial sales of UAS are forecasted to increase from 600,000 in 2016 to
approximately 2.7 million by 2020 (FAA, 2016c, p. 1). Future researchers should focus
on the potential influence of this rapid UAS integration into the NAS and its potential
impact on aviation safety as well as its potential to negatively influence runway
incursions. As UAS are likely to substantially increase within the NAS during the next
several decades, research considering their influence on aviation safety as well as its
implications on the efficient operation of the NAS is of critical importance.
In conclusion, several areas exist where additional research would be helpful in
developing information that could improve aviation safety and have a positive effect on
reducing runway incursions throughout the nation. With additional knowledge, the FAA,
foreign governments, and all aviation safety stakeholders can stay focused on improving
aviation safety throughout the NAS and the world.
Chapter Summary and Conclusion
This chapter provided an interpretation of the results from the research study. It
further addressed implications for social change and provided recommendations for
future action and studies. The chapter served to clarify the results of this study within the
context of aviation safety.
Runway incursions have been a serious problem jeopardizing aviation safety
worldwide for decades. The FAA has worked diligently to decrease the number and
severity of runway incursions since the implementation of the RSP. The research problem
presented in this study was whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP effectively reduced runway
incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. I sought to determine whether the RSP was
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effective in reducing runway incursions by examining their types, severity, and phases of
flight using data from 3 years before and 3 years after the FAA 2009–2011 RSP. An
analysis of the data produced established that although the RSP has made some progress,
it has not effectively reduced runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports.
Limited progress has been made to decrease the severity of runway incursions as well as
positively influencing the phase of flight that incursions most often occur, but increased
emphasis needs to be placed on decreasing pilot deviations within the NAS.
The FAA, foreign governments, and aviation stakeholders across the world should
use the findings from this study to effectively modify future runway safety programs. By
utilizing these findings, the number of runway incursions will decrease, thereby
improving aviation safety for the flying public and assisting in the continued
development of the aviation industry around the world. Through safer aviation, an
increasing number of the world’s people will be able to enjoy aviation-related jobs and
the aviation industry will continue its significant development for many years into the
future. This results in positive social change for the many people throughout the world
who rely, or will rely, on aviation for the improvement of their lives.
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